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Abstract
Since 2009, tensions have increased markedly between China and its maritime
neighbors over disputed territories in the East and South China Seas. China’s neighbors
accuse it of acting like a bully, alleging that China engages in behavior that is aggressive,
inappropriate, and oppressive. But can such accusations be substantiated through
objective analysis, or is bullying truly in the eye of the beholder? Further, is China
simply acting boldly, albeit in a manner that is justifiable, as it emerges as a leader in the
region? The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether labeling China’s behavior as
“bullying” (as China’s smaller and less powerful neighbors view it) is accurate, and
whether any definitive conclusions can be drawn concerning the assertive nature of
China’s conduct. Moreover, given how China’s neighbors perceive Chinese maritime
policy, this thesis examined how the stability of East Asia might be impacted by smaller
states’ perceptions. A two-tiered methodological approach was employed that includes
examining specific instances of conflict between China and its neighbors, and a content
and trend analysis of regional media reporting on the disputed claims issue. Ultimately,
the ongoing territorial disputes between China and its maritime neighbors were used as a
case environment for exploring how smaller states perceive and react to the actions of
great and/or aspiring powers. The case demonstrates that small states sometimes
perceive themselves to be victims of great power behavior, whether or not such
perceptions are accurate, and that the friction between great power conduct and small
state perceptions can contribute to instability that endangers an entire region.
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Figure 1 – Map of East and South China Sea Maritime Claims
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Source: Strafor 2012, http://cogitansiuvenis.blogspot.com/2012/07/south-china-sea-graphicsupdate.html.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Disputes over territory in the maritime regions adjacent to China’s eastern and
southern coasts have fueled tensions in East Asia since the end of the World War II.
During that time, relations between certain East Asian nations have been marked by a
moderate degree of hostility as they compete for control of the region’s many islands,
shoals, reefs, banks, and other geographic features. The question of who controls those
landforms and, more importantly, their adjacent waters, continues to be a matter of debate
that shows few signs of abating. On rare occasions, competition over territory has been
punctuated by spats of armed violence, though in general, nations have exercised restraint
over resorting to such harsh measures. In the past several years, however, these long
contentious, but previously manageable, disputes have escalated to an unprecedented
level, increasing concern among world leaders that one slight miscalculation could turn a
relatively minor incident into a full-blown international conflagration. For example, the
January 19, 2013 incident in which a Chinese naval vessel illuminated its target tracking
radar to track a Japanese surface vessel and helicopter1 could easily have resulted in
Japanese forces taking defensive measures that might have included the use of tactical
weapons against the Chinese vessel.
The disputes over territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have
evolved into one of the more pressing security challenges the region has observed since
the end of World War II. Moreover, the strategic significance of these maritime zones
2

for global commerce has sparked concern among international leaders; a major disruption
in a region that handles half of the world’s maritime shipping traffic2 and one third of the
world’s petroleum shipments3 would undoubtedly have far-reaching, adverse
consequences for the world economy. Although the escalation of tensions in East Asia’s
maritime regions comes as a result of numerous countries’ refusals to back down in
pursuit of their territorial claims, such as Vietnam’s claims over the Spratly Islands and
the Philippines’ claims to portions of the Paracel Islands, the expansion of tensions is in
large measure attributed to the actions of China, the region’s dominant power. Several
states, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, accuse China of endangering the
region’s peace and security by engaging in provocative behavior at the tactical level and
by taking inflammatory action at the strategic level. For example, Chinese vessels’
deliberate cutting of cables towed by Vietnamese survey vessels in the South China Sea
has sparked anger in Hanoi;4 more frequent flights by Chinese reconnaissance planes near
the Japanese-claimed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are irritating Tokyo;5 the
establishment of Chinese military garrisons in the South China Sea worry Manila;6 and
alleged Chinese attempts to interfere with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) efforts to calm tensions in the region have been viewed with concern by other
world powers, including the United States.7
Moreover, evidence suggests that within the East Asia region, public opinion of
China has been declining over the past several years. Recent public polling conducted by
the Gallup Organization indicates that perceptions among China’s maritime neighbors
concerning Chinese leadership have become increasingly negative. When respondents in
these nations are asked whether they approve or disapprove of the job performance of the
3

leadership of China, approval ratings tend to be low, and in most cases the ratings have
progressively decreased since 2010. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 2 – Public perceptions of China among selected Asian nations (Gallup Poll
Results)8
Question asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of China?”

Approval (%)

Clearly Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, and Indonesia all
increasingly disapprove of China’s leadership over the past several years. The most
precipitous drops in approval ratings appear to have occurred in Indonesia (a drop of 30
percentage points within four years), Vietnam (a drop of 17 percentage points over four
years), and Japan (a drop of 15 percentage points in just three years). The decrease in
approval among other nations is less pronounced, though the overall trend is downward.
It is difficult to pinpoint from this data what is driving the downward trend in how China
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is being perceived by its maritime neighbors. However, it is apparent that the overall
trend coincides with the recent escalation in maritime disputes.
What is certain is that China’s claims frequently conflict with those of its
neighbors. Although the maritime territorial disputes is an undeniably complex issue
involving overlapping claims of numerous countries, China’s behavior feeds the
perception that it is a bully in the region.
Figure 3: Vietnamese demonstrator protests against perceived Chinese aggression in the
South China Sea
Source: Information Security Biweekly, May 2013. http://biweekly.isvoc.com/category/south-china-sea

But is it fair to label China a bully? The purpose of this thesis is to explore this
question and to analyze Chinese activity in East Asia’s disputed maritime regions in
order to interpret China’s conduct from the perspective of smaller states. Indeed, China’s
interaction with its neighbors provides a case environment for exploring how smaller
5

states perceive the actions taken against them by larger powers. Three specific issues
will be addressed:
1. Is China bullying its maritime neighbors?
2. What are the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully?
3. What is the impact of Chinese behavior for the East Asia region?
The first question requires an examination of bullying theory and an analysis of
China’s interaction with its maritime neighbors. Answering the second and third
questions, which are admittedly more interpretive in nature, requires an examination of
China’s strategic goals and its general approach to conducting foreign policy roughly
since the time of Deng Xiaoping. In general, major powers and aspiring powers have
been labeled as provocateurs whose actions and assertiveness endanger everyone, and
this is grounded on the assumption that strong states always exploit weaker ones. But
how smaller states perceive and react to the actions of more powerful nations is not the
sole determinant for characterizing the behavior of aspiring powers. With respect to
China specifically, a fair assessment can only be made after considering China’s recent
behavior in the context of contemporary Chinese foreign policy and China’s strategic
aspirations.
Background
In the East China Sea, the conflict between China and Japan over five tiny islands
(known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, and the Senkaku Islands in Japan) stems from the
late nineteenth century decision by Japan to annex the islands. In short, Japan argues that
it annexed the islands in 1895 at a time when no other country claimed sovereignty over
6

them.9 China disputes this historical interpretation, contending that the islands have
always belonged to China and that Japan annexed them unlawfully. The islands, taken
into the possession of the United States at the conclusion of the Second World War, were
returned to Japan in 1972.10 China began asserting its claim to the islands and the
territory surrounding them in the late 1970s when armed Chinese fishing vessels staged
nearby demonstrations. Since then, the islands have been a source of constant friction
between the two nations, and occasional flare-ups have occurred. Most recently, in
August 2012, in a move to prevent a prominent nationalist Japanese politician from
exacerbating tensions by purchasing the islands himself, the Japanese government
purchased the islands from their private owners and nationalized them.11 Japan’s official
purchase of the island touched off a firestorm of anti-Japanese protests in China,
culminating in attacks on Japanese property and resulting in some Japanese companies
suspending their operations in certain Chinese cities.12 Although the fever pitch of antiJapanese sentiment expressed in the late summer and early autumn of 2012 has since
subsided, bitter feelings persist and tensions over the issue remain high even today.
In the South China Sea, merely identifying a historical starting point for
determining sovereignty claims is a matter of debate. A map, dubbed the “Nine Dash
Line,” purportedly first produced by China in 194713 but never afforded much attention
until the Chinese Communist Party reintroduced it in 1992,14 depicts the entirety of the
South China Sea as belonging to China. Other Southeast Asian countries dispute China’s
assertion that the entire South China Sea falls within Chinese jurisdiction, and they cite
maps drawn up during the Qing Dynasty in 1904 which depict China’s southernmost
border as Hainan Island (located at the very northern portion of the South China Sea – a
7

far cry from the claims made by the “Nine Dash Line” map).15 But China has crafted
responses to this as well. In an attempt to refute other nations’ claims and to erase any
doubt about who maintains sovereign rights to the region’s waters, the Chinese
government has pointed to ancient maps that date back as far as the 13th century.
According to Chinese government officials, such maps mention islands well south of
Hainan Island, and China claims that these are evidence of its rightful sovereignty over
the region’s vast maritime territories.16
Incidents of conflict between China and other nations over maritime territory have
occurred since the 1950s, though conflict took on a new dimension in the 1970s as
offshore petroleum exploration began in earnest and nations began to claim unsettled land
features and their surrounding waters.17 Most frequently, incidents of conflict have
included the occupation and occasional garrisoning of troops on contested islands,
confrontations between civilian and naval vessels, the erecting of structures on disputed
maritime outcroppings, arrests and detentions at sea, boat collisions, and the use of
aircraft to intimidate ocean-going vessels. In some instances, China and its neighbors
have resorted to the use of force to settle disputes. In early 1974, for example, Vietnam
claimed the Paracel Islands of the South China Sea as a province of Vietnam, to which
China responded by sending a small naval contingent to the area. A battle ensued in
which 36 troops from both sides were killed.18 An armed clash between the two nations
also occurred in 1988 over Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, during which Chinese
gunboats sank a Vietnamese transport ship carrying Vietnamese soldiers.19 In addition to
its occasional armed confrontations with Vietnam, China occasionally clashed with the
Philippines. In 1996, for example, China engaged with the Philippines in a 90 minute
8

gun battle over Capones Island in the South China Sea.20 Such clashes, however, have
been rare and limited in scope, and although they have certainly contributed to tensions in
the region, the disputes have ultimately remained manageable. Overall, between 1950
and April 2013, no less than 73 documented incidents of conflict have occurred between
China and other states whose interests overlap in the maritime regions of East and
Southeast Asia.21
Clearly, conflict and confrontation between China and others in the region over
disputed territory is not a new development. However, it is worth noting that the number
of incidents of confrontation has increased since 2009. Although the period from 1950
through 2008 saw a total of 46 incidents of conflict, the brief period January 1, 2009 –
April 1, 2013 has seen a total of 27 significant incidents.22 Several reasons may explain
why the period since 2008 has witnessed an increase in such incidents. For example,
some China scholars argue that in the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis, many
Chinese leaders were emboldened by the apparent financial fragility of the West, and
may have interpreted it as an opportunity to advance Chinese interests.23 Consequently,
Chinese leaders deliberately embarked on a more assertive approach to interacting with
the international community. China’s bold behavior in the East and South China Seas, in
particular, presumably reflects this more general, assertive Chinese foreign policy.
Without question, securing access to energy deposits located beneath the seabed is
another factor contributing to an increase in the number of conflict occurrences.
Geological survey estimates suggest that as many as 160 million barrels of oil24 and 290
trillion cubic feet of natural gas25 are locked beneath the sea in these regions. As home of
the world’s second and third largest economies, and an additional number of rapidly
9

burgeoning economies, Asia has seen intense and increasing competition for these
resources.26 However, identifying and thoroughly examining the overarching reasons for
the ongoing maritime territorial disputes is beyond the scope of this project. Rather, the
purpose here is to analyze Chinese behavior in the disputed maritime regions in the
context of bullying theory and to assess the consequences of Chinese actions.
Although in recent years there has been no loss of life related to events on the seas,
there have been a number of recent developments that raise concern among those in the
region and within the international community. In general, the concern is that as a result
of China’s recent policy, the heretofore seen pattern of low-intensity, occasional
altercations between China and its neighbors may be moving toward a pattern of largerscale, regular, and potentially violent confrontations with wide-ranging and adverse
consequences. Fears persist about tactical level encounters quickly and uncontrollably
escalating to strategic level crises.27 China’s increasing willingness to challenge other
nations at the tactical level has raised concerns about prospects for regional stability. In
addition to concerns over the increasing frequency of tactical level engagements,
concerns have been raised over China’s recent strategic level maneuvering. These
maneuvers will be analyzed thoroughly in a later chapter, but given their significance in
shaping the nature of the disputes, it is appropriate to introduce them here.
In June 2012, China announced that it had granted prefecture level status to a
small city called Sansha located on Woody Island in the South China Sea.28 China now
claims that Sansha, a city of merely 1,100 non-indigenous residents on an island hardly
large enough to accommodate an airstrip, has administrative jurisdiction over the
territorial waters encompassing the Spratly as well as Paracel Islands.29 The unilateral
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move to extend Chinese control southward into the South China Sea has been viewed by
others in the region as an absurd Chinese attempt to justify its claims of sovereignty. 30 In
addition to upgrading Sansha’s status to the prefecture level, China established a new
military garrison on the island.31 Although a small garrison of Chinese soldiers located in
Sansha poses no real military threat to other claimants in the region, some still find the
development disturbing as it gives China a pretext for claiming sovereignty over a larger
swath of maritime territory.
In November 2012, the Chinese Foreign Ministry began issuing passports to
Chinese citizens that depicted a map of China including the “Nine Dash Line” boundary
enveloping the entire South China Sea. The less-than-subtle suggestion of Chinese
sovereignty over the entire sea was not well received by China’s maritime neighbors. In
Vietnam, border and customs officials were instructed not to recognize the new passports
and to deny stamping them until a new visa had been issued and affixed to the passports.
The new visas depicted a Vietnamese-approved map of the region.32 The move also
elicited unfavorable reactions from the Philippines, Taiwan, and India.33
China has also recently been engaged in what many consider to be a policy of
interfering with regional multilateral efforts to settle the dispute in the South China Sea.
Certain members of ASEAN, as well as outside observers, accuse China of meddling in
ASEAN affairs in an attempt to keep the organization from reaching a consensus on a
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Accusations have been made about China
pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy and wielding its influence over certain ASEAN
member states in an attempt to fracture the organization over the territorial disputes
issue.34 In fact, in the summer of 2012, for the first time in its 45 year history, the
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ASEAN Regional Forum failed to reach an accord and was unable to issue a joint
communiqué due to its members’ inability to agree on a proposed Code of Conduct.35
Most notably, perhaps, in November 2012, it was announced that the Hainan
Provincial police would be authorized to stop, board, and search foreign vessels
“violating” Chinese territorial waters beginning in January 2013. The provincial police
were granted authority to detain personnel and confiscate communications equipment of
vessels suspected of “trespassing” in Chinese waters.36 This announcement raised a
chorus of concern from the international community.
These recent developments, as well as a number of tactical level conflicts
occurring at sea, will be analyzed to determine what impacts they are having on China’s
relationship with its maritime neighbors. Likewise, they will be analyzed to explore what
the consequences of these actions could spell for China’s strategic, long-term aspirations.
Whatever position one takes regarding these developments, what is undeniable is that
China receives a great deal of criticism for its actions. China is often accused by its
neighbors of being a bully, muscling its way around the region, and attempting to
intimidate those who dispute its territorial claims.
Outline
In order to determine whether China is bullying its neighbors, to identify the
benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully, and to assess the impact of bullying
in the East Asia region, I will take the following approach. Chapter 2 is an overview of
Chinese foreign policy, strategy, and goals since 1978, and briefly examines basic
theories about the behavior of aspiring powers and power-transition states. A review of
these theories proves useful for explaining China’s recent behavior and for assessing the
12

costs and benefits of such policy for China’s greater interests. Chapter 3 examines the
premises of bullying theory, outlines the key characteristics of bullying, discusses how
bullying occurs among individuals and groups, and identifies the typical consequences of
the behavior. Examining the premises of bullying theory provides a foundation for
investigating how bullying applies to China in the context of the maritime territorial
disputes. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used to analyze China’s behavior,
consisting of evaluating contentious incidents occurring between China and its maritime
neighbors at both the tactical level (on the seas), and at the strategic level (national policy
level). A total of 27 incidents are investigated occurring between January 2010 and April
2013. A content review and trend analysis of media reporting on the disputes in various
claimant states is also covered. Chapter 5 presents and analyzes the findings of the
research that characterize China’s behavior and its impact. The final chapter, Chapter 6,
assesses the overall benefits and costs of China’s behavior for its strategic interests, and
how China’s behavior impacts East Asia regional security and stability.
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Chapter 2 – China’s Contemporary Foreign Policy and Strategic Goals

The purpose of this chapter is to identify China’s strategic goals or core interests,
and to discuss how China has pursued those goals in the 1978 – 2012 period. In order to
examine the costs and benefits of China’s behavior, especially in terms of its strategic
interests, and to draw conclusions about the potential impact of China’s behavior for
regional stability, it is essential to identify what those interests are and what China’s
general approach to conducting foreign policy has been roughly since the time of Deng
Xiaoping. Understanding China’s interests and how China has interacted with its
maritime neighbors and the international community during this period may help shed
light on why China is pursuing its current approach with regard to disputed maritime
claims. Additionally, this chapter briefly examines the behavior of aspiring powers and
the basic characteristics of power-transitions that prove useful for explaining China’s
recent behavior and for assessing the potential consequences of its behavior. The
interpretation of Chinese foreign policy in this thesis relies on the analyses of Western
scholars, including works by Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell (2012), David
Shambaugh (2012), Robert Sutter (2012), Odd Arne Westad (2012), and Suisheng Zhao
(2004-2012). These scholars tend to agree that Chinese foreign policy from the Deng
period until 2009 was marked by pragmatism, whereas a noticeable shift away from a
pragmatic approach began to occur in 2009.

14

Core Interests
Every nation defines its core national interests, and a nation’s foreign policy is in
large measure driven by those interests. China is no different in this respect. As a
geographically vast country and a rising power among the community of nations, China’s
interests are understandably diverse and have evolved over recent years as China’s power
has grown. However, China has maintained several key, fundamental “core interests”
that have endured for the better part of the post-Mao and post-Cold War years. In 2009,
State Councilor Dai Binguo listed these core interests as: maintaining China’s
fundamental system and state security, protecting state sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and ensuring continued stable development of China’s economy and society.37
Similarly, a 2011 white paper issued by China’s official Information Office of the State
Council described these core interests in terms of state sovereignty, national security,
territorial integrity, national reunification, sustaining China’s political system and overall
social stability, and ensuring sustainable economic and social development.38 Taken
together, China’s core interests can be summarized as follows:
1. Protect China’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. Protect and maintain China’s system of government.
3. Ensure stability for uninterrupted economic and social development.
For the past thirty years, the PRC has placed particular emphasis on economic and
social progress --- a critical foundation upon which China’s other two interests depend.
Economic modernization and social development are perceived to be the way for China
to realize its potential as a great power and to command respect within the community of
nations after having suffered through what it considers a “century of humiliation” at the
15

hands of outside powers.39 In fact, China considers economic and social development not
only as a key to erasing a troubled past, but as a means for enhancing legitimacy for the
Chinese Communist Party, thus strengthening the fundamental system of government and
state security. Likewise, China perceives economic prosperity as a pathway to
strengthening its military capabilities and, hence, its capacity to protect its sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Overall, China’s three core interests, accurately described as the
nation’s “bottom-line of national survival”,40 signal to the world what China considers
absolutely essential for its existence and evolution as a great nation. Moreover, each of
these overarching interests have remained consistent throughout the post-Mao era, and all
three have had a substantial impact on how China has conducted its foreign policy during
this period.
China has made clear that safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity
necessarily includes the question of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Province.41 Events in
each of these regions have routinely generated a good deal of international controversy,
and China has consistently reiterated that it considers these issues as internal, sovereign
matters not to be interfered with by outside nations. Furthermore, China has indicated
that it is willing to take action (i.e. use force) to protect its territorial interests in these
areas. Some China experts contend that starting in 2010, China added the South China
Sea to its list of core interests,42 or that in any case, the PRC began treating the South
China Sea as a core interest in 2010.43 However, others maintain that China never
actually elevated the South China Sea to “core interest” status, and that this has been
demonstrated by China’s (as yet) unwillingness to use force to protect its South China
Sea claims.44 This contrasts with China’s stated willingness to use force to protect its
16

claims to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Province. (The question of whether China
intended to add the South China Sea to its list of core interests arose during high level,
private meetings between the Chinese Foreign Ministry and U.S. State Department
officials in 2010. The State Department eventually explained that the term “core interest”
had never been used during the meetings, and that Chinese officials had used the term
“national priority” to express China’s attitude toward the South China Sea.).45 These
experts argue that the South China Sea is simply not on the same level as Taiwan when it
comes to China’s territorial interests. Nonetheless, Beijing has remained deliberately
opaque on the issue, and has done nothing to dispel rumors that it might eventually use
force to protect its interests in the region.46
In addition to economic, political, and security related matters, a number of other
factors have contributed significantly to shaping China’s world view. Demography,
geography, and history have all had a substantial impact on how the PRC sees its role in
global affairs today.47 At 1.3 billion citizens, China must manage a population that is not
only enormous, but that is ethnically diverse, largely poor, rapidly aging, and highly
concentrated in specific regions within the country.48 Such demographic characteristics
create challenges for the PRC and place demands on Chinese leaders as they determine
how to govern their country. Geographically, the PRC is surrounded by nations whose
governments, cultures, world views, and interests contrast significantly with those of
China. Arguably, China is exposed in all directions to instability and pressure, and the
potential for conflict exists all along China’s periphery.49 Thus China has been, and
continues to be, acutely sensitive to its border security; this is especially true in the north
and along its seacoasts.50 With respect to history, China today is in many ways driven by
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feelings of historic humiliation and wounded national pride.51 Scholars contend that
China’s experience with national humiliation, having endured such abasement at the
hands of outside powers beginning in the 19th century, not only shapes how China views
itself, but shapes its perception of strategic reality.52 China today continues to suffer
from a sense of insecurity and vulnerability that stems from decades of mistreatment at
the hands of outside powers. This insecurity and perceived vulnerability is certainly
reflected in China’s core interests, and it affects how China conducts its foreign policy.
Identifying China’s core interests and the factors influencing China’s world view
provides an essential pretext for understanding how Chinese foreign policy has been
conducted over the past three decades. With these core interests and underlying policyshaping factors in mind, we now turn to a brief examination of how Chinese leaders have
chosen to conduct their nation’s foreign policy since 1978.
Foreign Policy
The death of Mao Zedong precipitated an end to what had been China’s policy of
seclusion and self-isolation from the international community. Under Mao, decisions
regarding Chinese foreign policy were very much driven by ideology and often came at
the expense of China’s economic development. In the wake of Mao’s death, however,
and with the inception of Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented economic policies, a new era
began in which the importance of ideology in making foreign policy began to wane. In
December of 1978, Deng initiated a pragmatic “socialist modernization” agenda,53
launching China on a trajectory of rapid economic development that remains unmatched
in modern history for a country of China’s size. Under Deng, ideology had “lost salience
to the motivation of pragmatic power politics”,54 and Chinese leaders began to embrace
18

an alternative, ideologically agnostic, “pragmatic” approach to guide foreign policy
formulation and implementation. Adopting a pragmatic approach meant that China’s
conduct and pursuit of its strategic goals would be conditioned by historical experiences
and the geostrategic environment,55 and not by ideology.
Beginning in 1979, Deng instituted numerous reforms that ushered in a new era of
openness. An official policy of “reform and opening” was announced, in which domestic
economic and administrative systems were liberalized, and economic self-sufficiency was
abandoned.56 As a result, China enjoyed newfound access to world markets, investment
opportunities, and technologies. Under Deng’s leadership, China began to experiment
with a market-based economic approach, gradually introducing capitalist elements into
what had previously been a closed socialist economy. This period of opening up also saw
China express interest in becoming a more active participant in global affairs and
multilateral institutions.
As China emerged from its isolation, Deng also made it a priority to forge closer
diplomatic relations with other nations of the world, particularly with China’s neighbors
in Southeast Asia.57 During this period of normalizing relations, Chinese diplomacy was
in large measure driven by the necessities of economic reform. In fact, relations with
foreign states were evaluated almost entirely on their potential contribution to China’s
modernization.58 For Deng, the most important consideration for a China emerging from
decades of isolation and economic deprivation was to modernize China and advance its
economy. Deng’s deep-seeded desire to see China catch-up with the rest of the world
and to pull China’s hundreds of millions of impoverished citizens from squalor became a
key driving force behind Chinese foreign policy. Little else mattered, and to the extent
19

that relations with other nations offered an avenue for China’s modernization, Deng
encouraged leaders of China’s Communist Party to reach out and establish positive
relationships with China’s neighbors and the global community.
At the same time that China began to forge ahead as a more active participant in
the global forum, Deng counseled China’s leadership to avoid getting ahead of world
issues prematurely, and to avoid stirring up trouble. Rather, he advised that China should
remain focused on taking advantage of opportunities, bide its time, and gradually build
power and influence.59 To move too quickly and to be too ambitious could be
counterproductive as this would raise the fears and suspicions of other nations. In fact,
China’s leaders had good reason to worry about raising the suspicions of its neighbors.
Many already resented China and viewed it as a threat given the PRC’s sponsoring of
communist opposition forces in their countries during the 1960s and early 1970s.60
The premise behind adopting such a pragmatic approach was to foster a stable
international environment conducive to promoting unrestrained economic growth. In the
immediate post-Mao era, Chinese leaders, mindful of China’s weakness relative to
Western nations and to the United States in particular, sought to avoid confrontation with
such nations. A policy of defending the national interest by conducting a shrewd
diplomacy requiring “rationality and calmness”61 became China’s preferred option. The
overarching goal of pursuing unmolested economic development was best served by
ensuring a secure and stable international environment. As such, a “periphery policy”, or
“good neighbor policy”, was instituted in which China sought to keep or establish
positive relations with other countries in the region. Maintaining good relations with its
neighbors would demonstrate that China was interested in maintaining stability, and this
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was inextricably tied with China’s overarching objective of economic modernization.62
Hence, as far as economic development was concerned, China should push full speed
ahead with modernizing as rapidly as possible. But China could afford to take its time,
hide its light, and nurture its strength63 before assuming a leading role in world relations.
Presumably, China would eventually grow strong enough to flex its muscles and take on
a new role in global affairs. But this notion was kept vague, and China’s expected future
role was unspecified.
Deng’s eventual successors saw value in continuing the policy of keeping a low
profile while nurturing strength, and of minimizing resistance to China’s rise by
downplaying both its power and its ambition as much as possible.64 In the mid 1990s,
Jiang Zemin set policy guidelines to “enhance trust, reduce friction, develop cooperation,
and avoid confrontation”.65 Slogans such as “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development”
were adopted by Beijing, and hopeful if not gaudy language about countries of the world
joining hands to “strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common
prosperity” was communicated by government leaders.66 (Interestingly, the slogan
“peaceful rise” was rather abruptly amended to “peaceful development” in order to avoid
fostering the impression that China’s growth in any way constituted a threat to other
nations of the world.). Furthermore, China’s leaders made frequent efforts to calm
international anxiety by publicly pronouncing that China had no intention of overtaking
the international order. “China never seeks hegemony” was a quote quite often cited by
leaders in Beijing.67
Hence, heeding the advice of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders carried on with
their pragmatic approach to foreign policy, ever mindful of not being perceived to
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threaten China’s neighbors or the existing international order. Such policy persisted
through 2008 and was remarkably successful in terms of providing China the opportunity
to pursue its core interests and achieve astonishing growth. Admittedly there were rough
spots during this period, during which friction between China and its neighbors, and
China and the West, was exposed. For example, the 1989 incident at Tiananmen Square
was particularly harmful to China’s renewed relations with the West. China’s record on
human rights and its alleged insensitivities toward specific ethnic groups within its
borders (e.g. unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang province) strained relations between China and
other members of the international community. Furthermore, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
Crisis also brought to the surface conflicting interests and tensions between China and the
international community. Concerns about China as a possible threat to the region began
to mount.
By the late 1990s, China recognized that in spite of its many diplomatic
achievements, the set-backs it experienced had bred mistrust among China’s regional
neighbors and tarnished China’s reputation with the great nations of the world. Realizing
this was problematic, and desiring to mitigate historical feelings of mistrust among its
neighbors, China’s leaders launched a conscious diplomatic effort to strengthen relations
with its neighbors and to improve ties all around its periphery.68 In 1997, in an attempt to
mitigate the perception of a “China threat”, China introduced its New Security Concept.69
Implementing this concept included stepping-up efforts to engage diplomatically,
economically, and militarily with its neighbors. This moderate foreign policy approach
continued well in to the 2000s. The period saw a decline in Chinese criticism of Japan
and of U.S. security cooperation with other states in the region.70 China began to
22

demonstrate a new flexibility and willingness to engage in negotiations with the other
claimants to South China Sea territories,71 going so far as to agree to a Declaration of
Conduct (DoC) for the South China Sea in 2002, in which China pledged to resolve
sovereignty disputes peacefully with other claimants.72 Likewise, China sought to
establish influence with its Southeast Asian neighbors at the expense of the United States,
attempting to build regional security forums that excluded the U.S. For instance, China
steadily increased its trade with ASEAN countries throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,
having reached a trade volume of $41 billion by 2001.73 By 2010, that number had
increased to $297 billion.74 The overall effort lasted until 2008 and has been described as
an excellent and effective period in Chinese diplomacy.75
Nonetheless, an undercurrent of suspicion and wariness on the part of China’s
East Asian neighbors persisted, and concerns over what China’s development meant for
the region kept nations from growing too enamored with their large and ever-growing
neighbor. Indeed, in 2009 China’s leaders began to take a more assertive position to
conducting foreign policy. Contrary to what Deng had counseled regarding keeping a
low profile and avoiding disruption with outside nations, Chinese leaders began to
engage in sharp rhetoric and policy disagreements both bilaterally and multilaterally.
Perhaps most prominently, Beijing became much more vocal about challenging the
United States’ right to operate its military vessels in China’s 200 mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).76 On three occasions in 2009, for example, China reacted to U.S.
ships operating in waters near China in a manner that the U.S. Navy perceived as
harassing. In March of that year, a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries vessel harassed the
USNS Victorious in the Yellow Sea by shining a high-powered spotlight on it,77 and later
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that month five Chinese government vessels harassed the USNS Impeccable in the South
China Sea.78 Likewise, in June of 2009, a Chinese submarine trailed the USS John
McCain in the South China Sea, and was suspected of colliding with and damaging the
sonar equipment the McCain was towing.79 Although this period of “Chinese
assertiveness”80 and its accompanying diplomatic missteps did not result in irreparable
damage being done, it nonetheless had a significantly negative impact on China’s
relations with some of its most important regional partners. In a very short period
beginning in 2009, China’s relations with many of its neighbors (as well as with the U.S.,
EU, and ASEAN) deteriorated to uncharacteristic lows.81 Some scholars even consider
the period beginning in 2009 as the most serious setback for Chinese influence in
Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War.82 It remains a matter of debate whether
China’s change of diplomatic course has been a deliberate, systematic attempt to exercise
power at the expense of straining relations with so many countries simultaneously.
Nevertheless, departing with the traditional method of conducting foreign policy (i.e.
maintaining harmonious relations with other nations) unquestionably has had a negative
cumulative effect on China’s diplomatic image.83

Aspiring Powers
In order to better understand China’s recent foreign policy in the East and South
China Seas, it is worth briefly examining what international relations theory has to say
about the nature of power relationships between states, the characteristics of power
transitions, and the behavior of aspiring powers. Numerous theories of international
relations have been proposed since the end of the Second World War, each seeking to
explain the nature of state behavior and state-state interactions. One of the more widely
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accepted schools of thought is realism. Advocates of realism (including renown theorists
such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Kenneth Waltz) posit that all states
within the international system act rationally, pursue their self-interests, and that the
primary concern of all states is survival.84 Although all realists subscribe to these
underlying assumptions, in the past several decades two distinct sub-categories have
evolved within the overarching framework of realism: “balance of power realism”, and
“hegemonic realism”.85 Ultimately, balance of power realist theory proposes that high
concentrations of power in the system are destabilizing, whereas equal distributions of
power among states tends to contribute to peace and stability.86 Proponents of this school
of thought argue that countries who enjoy a disproportionate degree of power will
attempt to take advantage of their superior position to attack their weaker rivals.87
The other school of realist thought, hegemonic realism, accepts basic realist
assumptions about the role of power in international relations, but rejects balance of
power theory. Contrary to balance of power theory, hegemonic realism posits that
concentrations of power are inherently stabilizing and promote peace and stability rather
than detract from it.88 As with balance of power theory, hegemonic realism also consists
of several sub-theories. Perhaps the most prominent among these, and the first of the
hegemonic realist theories to develop, is A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory.
Originally proposed in 1958, this theory envisions global politics as a hierarchy of
nations with varying degrees of cooperation and competition.89 It acknowledges that
power arrangements and power distribution among states will fluctuate over time. But it
proposes that as states become more evenly matched in terms of strength, it is likely that
relatively weaker states will challenge the status quo international arrangement. In 1980,
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Organski and Jacek Kugler published their seminal work, The War Ledger, in which their
research reveals that as aspiring states approach power parity with an established power,
conflict often ensues.
Organski and Kugler examine historical instances of power transitions occurring
between major states and discuss how such transitions have resulted in large-scale,
international wars. Although their analysis is focused primarily on determining the
origins, outcomes, and consequences of major wars,90 they nonetheless provide some
insightful discussion regarding the expected behavior of aspiring powers and the potential
consequences of their behavior. A key observation is made concerning the link between
a state’s economic growth, its national power, its behavior, and the potential for conflict.
They illustrate how the extent to which a state experiences economic growth directly
impacts that state’s level of national power. An increase in national power, defined as a
nation’s capacity to control the behavior of others in accordance with its own ends,91 can
in turn be a key determinant of state conduct and, consequently, the occurrence of
conflict. In general, as the power of aspiring states increases and power among nations
becomes more evenly distributed, the likelihood of conflict also increases. Organski and
Kugler demonstrate that this is so through their analysis of 19th and 20th century power
arrangements, nations’ economic growth, and the outbreak of major wars. Their research
shows that changes in power structure within the international order, spurred by
economic growth and associated competitive behavior by emerging states, is largely
responsible for the outbreak of war.92
In their analysis, Organski and Kugler also discuss historic relationships between
dominant powers and challenger states who desire to modify the existing international
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system. In short, aspiring powers are described as challengers who seek a new place for
themselves in the international hierarchy. It is proposed that challengers are states who
have acquired power through economic growth, but who feel a general sense of
dissatisfaction with their position in the international system. Challengers desire to
redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,93 have reason to believe they
can rival or even surpass the power of the dominant state, and ultimately act on their
desire to elevate their position in the prevailing system.94 Examples of this occurring
throughout history include Prussia’s challenge to France in 1870, Germany’s challenge to
the United Kingdom and Russia in 1914, and Germany’s challenge to the United
Kingdom once again in 1939. In each case, an emerging power overtook the dominant
power economically (as measured by GNP) and challenged the dominant power’s
position within the international hierarchy.95 The United States itself is known to have
engaged in such behavior. President Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine (which in 1904 announced U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere and
established a policy of preventive intervention in the Americas)96 serves as a prime
example of an emerging state challenging other powers within the system. What
Organski and Kugler’s analysis shows is that aspiring states’ attempts to redraft the rules
of the system and alter their position in the existing international order usually results in
conflict, and often leads to full-scale war.97 However, it must be noted that power
transitions do not necessarily make war inevitable; Organski and Kugler admit that
challengers may surpass the dominant nation without fighting it.98
Additionally, Organski and Kugler argue that an aspiring power’s challenge to the
dominant power and the prevailing international system is a process that may unfold
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gradually. Power transitions may occur over prolonged periods, perhaps decades in
duration, punctuated by isolated, lower level armed conflicts.99 Other scholars have
come to similar conclusions, noting that aspiring powers posing a challenge to the
existing order will seek to delegitimize the dominant power’s authority over an extended
period. The delegitimization phase may occur years before the critical inflection point of
a power transition100 and may include the implementation of cost-imposing strategies to
gradually undermine the dominant power. Such strategies may include voting against the
dominant power in international institutions, engaging in controversial uses of force
against the dominant power’s partners and allies, and making threats against pivotal
states that affect regional and international security. 101
In sum, history suggests that as nations grow economically, they grow more
powerful generally. Hence, it is not uncommon for them to challenge the prevailing
international system and to pose direct challenges to dominant powers. With this in mind,
China’s recent behavior in the East and South China Seas might be much less surprising.
Summary
This chapter has identified China’s strategic goals, or core interests, and has
discussed how China has pursued these goals since 1978. In general, China’s foreign
policy since the time of Deng Xiaoping has been focused on establishing conditions for
China to pursue rapid, unhindered economic development. As such, Chinese leaders
have generally opted for a pragmatic, non-confrontational approach to interacting with
other nations. China’s recent, more assertive stance with respect to the ongoing maritime
disputes is interpreted by many in the West as a departure from a well-established,
proven, highly successful foreign policy.
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Moreover, the general consensus among Western scholars appears to be that
China’s efforts have been largely driven by a persistent Chinese fear of falling behind the
rest of the world. The Chinese experience with what is considered to be a century of
humiliation, a period during which China was weak and vulnerable, has contributed to
China’s sense of urgency in its pursuit of power. Contemporary Chinese leaders are
determined to never again allow their country to be victimized at the hands of outside
nations. Hence, China’s recent behavior might very well come as a result of a persistent
sense of insecurity.
Regardless of the underlying causes, China’s recent behavior tends to be met with
pessimism and disapproval by Western scholars. The general consensus is that China has
been acting in a way that is not only unhelpful for the region, but that undermines
China’s own interests. While there is cautious optimism that China’s leaders will
ultimately return to a moderate, pragmatic approach to advancing China’s interests, many
admit that it is difficult to ascertain whether Chinese leaders will opt to pursue such a
course. For now, what is certain is that Chinese pragmatic foreign policy has contributed
substantially to the remarkable growth and increase in power China has experienced over
the past three decades. What is also clear, as demonstrated by recent actions in East
Asia’s maritime regions, is that some within the Chinese political establishment now feel
empowered by that growth and believe it is appropriate for China to exercise a more
assertive stance in the region.
History and a review of international relations theory suggests that given the
extent of China’s economic growth and its associated increase in national power, its
more assertive behavior is not entirely unexpected. But whether its more assertive
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position is to be expected, how should China’s behavior be characterized? The terms
“bully” and “bullying” have been used recurrently by many in the region to describe
China and its current maritime policy. But is it appropriate to label China as a bully?
Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to examine the theory behind
bullying behavior.
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Chapter 3 – Bully Theory

Numerous East Asian nations have concluded that China is a bully in the region.
In order to determine whether it is accurate to characterize China in such a way, it is first
necessary to understand bully behavior itself. The purpose of this chapter is to explore
bully theory as a pretext for better understanding China’s recent behavior in the East and
South China Seas. Sorting out the key characteristics of bully behavior, understanding
how bullying occurs among individuals and groups, and identifying the typical
consequences of bullying is helpful for assessing the extent to which China is bullying its
neighbors and for understanding how China’s behavior impacts its interests and the
region in general.
What is Bullying?
Bullying is a worldwide phenomenon, and it has been suggested that it is a
behavior rooted in human beings’ biological and evolutionary impulses.102 It is a
behavior that transcends cultures and political borders; one might encounter it anywhere.
Definitions of bullying and descriptions of what constitutes bullying behavior have varied
over the years. These definitions and descriptions continue to evolve as researchers
endeavor to better understand the behavior. How bullying is defined and how it is
perceived is often contextualized; definitions depend on the participants in a given
situation and the types of specific behaviors that are in question.103 History, time, and
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location each contribute to the definition of bullying. Thus, generally speaking, bullying
cannot be regarded in strictly black and white terms. There is rarely universal agreement
about what bullying is or how it should be interpreted. What one can say with certitude
is that attitudes toward violence and aggression are largely shared across cultures, and
that the general consensus on such behavior is that it is socially destructive.104
Literature on bullying contains certain themes that include: the intimidation of a
relatively weak party, attempts to coerce that party, the intent of one party to exert power
over another, the attempt to hide inadequacy, avoiding responsibility for behavior and its
effects, and initiating action to induce fear, low self-confidence, and low self-esteem.105
However, it appears it has not been easy to assign a specific definition to bullying
behavior. Some experts bemoan the inadequacy of a number of existing definitions and
point out that attempts to define bullying is a highly troubled process. To illustrate this
point, consider this definition of bullying: “The willful, conscious desire to hurt another
and put him/her under stress”.106 Such definitions are incomplete, are slightly misleading,
and therefore are insufficient for capturing what bully behavior entails. In this example,
the assumption is that anybody who is intent on harming another is, by definition, a bully.
Whether this is the case is questionable. Although disruptive, it is likely inappropriate to
label a single, one-time harmful act “bullying”. Moreover, it is questionable whether a
“willful, conscious desire to hurt” by itself is adequate for labeling one’s actions
“bullying”. The mere desire to harm does not necessarily mean that harmful action is
occurring. Rather, a willful desire to harm combined with a harmful act might be a more
appropriate way to describe bullying.
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What is generally accepted is that bullying involves obtaining, through force, that
to which one has no right.107 The common view also holds that bullying is behavior that
injures repeatedly, over a span of time.108 Likewise, the behavior can be blatant or subtle,
and can cover a wide spectrum of behaviors and responses.109 Bullying can come in the
form of physical or psychological abuse, or a combination of the two. Bullies might use
varying degrees of physical contact to intimidate a victim, or they might employ more
subtle tactics such as name-calling and social isolation.
Subject matter experts have offered numerous definitions of bullying. These
include:
1. Systematic abuse of power110
2. A willful, conscious desire to hurt another and put him/her under stress111
3. Exposure, repeatedly over time to negate actions on the part of one or more
other parties112
4. Longstanding violence, physical or psychological, conducted by an individual
or a group against an individual who is not able to defend himself in the actual
situation113
5. A special case of aggression which is social in nature114
6. Behavior which can be defined as the repeated attack – physical, psychological,
social or verbal – by those in a position of power, which is formally or
situationally defined on those who are powerless to resist, with the intention of
causing distress for their own gain or gratification115
7. Repeated oppression, physical or psychological, of a less powerful individual
by a more powerful individual116
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The careful observer will note how certain themes (e.g. power, harm, repetition, coercion,
and intimidation) recur throughout these definitions. At least one, and in some instances
several of these themes can be traced to the individual definitions above.
Also crucial to understanding bully behavior is the element of relative power, or
power differential. Researchers contend that bullying only occurs when an “imbalance of
power” exists.117 In order for one to be bullied, the aggressor or group of aggressors must
be more powerful than the party they are targeting.118 It is this power differential, or the
uneven distribution of power, that contributes markedly to enabling the bully to engage in
abusive action.119 Related to the concept of power differential is the absence of choice
for the weaker party. If one party lacks the ability to negotiate or exercise any
meaningful choice, an uneven distribution of power results.120 This, in turn, tends to
limit the options of the weaker party and, consequently, facilitates bullying.
Assigning a definition to bullying also requires accounting for another factor: how
aggressive behavior is perceived by the target, or victim, of the behavior. Some scholars
suggest that a sense of oppression is central to the concept of bullying. As such, it is
imperative that one take in to account the perspective of the targeted party and whether
that party actually interprets the behavior directed against it as oppressive.121 If behavior
is not perceived by the target to be troublesome, perhaps it is inappropriate to define the
behavior as “bullying”. At the same time, simply because a party considers itself to be a
target of aggressive behavior does not necessarily mean this is so. Occasionally there are
instances in which one party engages in behavior that is misinterpreted by another as
aggressive. The targeted party’s sense of being oppressed is a necessary but not the sole
determinant of whether bullying is occurring.122
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The foregoing discussion contributes to developing an understanding of what
bullying is. However, none of the definitions listed above, or the additional aspects of
bully behavior discussed thus far, succinctly capture what the behavior entails. Dennis
Lines123 attempts to capture the essence of bullying in one concise definition by
combining other definitions and related components of bully behavior. He submits that
bullying is “continual physical, psychological, social, verbal, or emotional methods of
intimidation by an individual or group”. Such a definition appears to coincide with the
definition provided by the American Psychological Association (APA), which describes
bullying as: “a form of aggressive behavior in which someone intentionally and
repeatedly causes another person injury or discomfort (and that) can take the form of
physical contact, words, or more subtle actions”.124 Drawing from each of the definitions
provided thus far, the key characteristics of bullying can be summarized as follows:
Table 1: Characteristics of Bullying (derived from multiple sources)
Overall characterized by…

threats or the actual use of violence

Preconditions include…

a power imbalance between aggressor and
victim

Aggressor desires…

to enhance power
to inflict harm

Behavior is…

aggressive
committed intentionally
repetitive

Actions committed are…

harmful
unprovoked
unjustified

Consequences include…

aggressor derives a sense of gratification
victim suffers a sense of oppression
victim suffers adverse physical and/or
psychological effects
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The basic themes and characteristics of bullying having thus been identified, it
becomes easier to consider bullying behavior in the context of state-to-state interactions.
However, before examining such behavior at the international level, it is necessary to
understand who bullies are, what the potential consequences of bullying are, and how
bullying behavior can be confronted.

Who Becomes a Bully?
Critical to comprehending the essence of bullying behavior is understanding who
the bullies themselves are. Who are the parties who engage in this destructive behavior,
how do they tend to behave, and what motivates them to behave as they do?
Without question, a number of factors contribute to the development of a bully.
Although researchers have identified a number of these factors, it is suggested that
ultimately there is no way to pin down a definitive set of influences that contribute to the
making of a bully. Under any definition of bullying, the causal factors for the behavior
may be complicated and variable,125 and most literature leans toward the notion that
bullies are not simply born, but are created.126 The environment in which one develops
appears to be the overriding factor in determining whether an individual becomes a bully.
Some researchers have identified two types of bullies: reactive and proactive.
Reactive bullies tend to see the world through a paranoid lens, feel constantly threatened,
view accidental incidents as acts of provocation, and believe an aggressive response is
justified whenever such perceived acts of provocation occur.127 Proactive bullies tend to
be more calculating about initiating harmful acts. They tend to behave in a nonemotional, controlled, deliberate manner, and are selective about their targets. Proactive
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bullies act based on deriving a sense of enjoyment from coercing or dominating a victim
as opposed to responding to some perceived external threat.128
Bullies may engage in a variety of disruptive behaviors. Some rely on physical
violence to impress their will on others. Such violence can be severe (e.g. beatings,
kicking, choking) or less violent acts of intimidation (e.g. tripping and pushing). Some
bullies may use verbal attacks as a method of intimidation; name calling, teasing, rumor
spreading, threats of violence, and spreading false information about a victim for the
purpose of embarrassing or hurting one’s reputation are all tactics that might be
employed. Additionally, bullying can entail socially isolating the victim and
manipulating friendship relationships.129
External circumstances can often impact how bullies behave. Many bullies start
out as victims themselves, and learn that their best defense is to be aggressive.130 Bullies
tend to surround themselves with “friends” who look up to them. However, such
friendships are rarely meaningful as those who associate with bullies tend to do so
primarily for fear of being targeted themselves by the bully. Another trait common to
bullies is that they have a dominant manner and cast blame on others for the unpleasant
things that occur in their lives. There is widespread agreement that bullies dump
“seething resentment, bitterness, hatred, and anger” onto others.131 Other experts have
identified bullies as those who tend to embrace belief systems supportive of aggression
and violence, and who suffer from feelings of depression, impulsivity, and a reduced
sense of belonging.132 Having said this, it must be mentioned that while many
psychologists believe that those who engage in bullying behavior do so as a result of low
self-esteem, more recent research suggests that this might not be the case. Some bullies
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tend to have very high self-esteem. Further, such individuals tend to have a sense of selfentitlement and superiority over others, lack compassion, lack an ability to control their
impulses, and may have some difficulty with social skills that are positive or constructive
in nature.133 Far from being socially inadequate, and although bullying is clearly
regarded as an anti-social, aggressive act, evidence suggests that bullies retain strong
social skills. As such, it is perhaps most appropriate to describe bullies as manipulators
with strong social skills.134
Bullying has been described as a very durable behavioral style, largely because
bullies get what they want, at least at first.135 A review of the material examined thus far
suggests that enhancing power is the ultimate aim a bully seeks to achieve, and that the
bully is willing to inflict harm as a means to achieve this end. The bully commits
aggressive acts, such as coercion, intimidation, and the threat or actual use of violence in
order to achieve his goals. As his goals are achieved, the bully derives a sense of power.
The process is ostensibly circular and self-reinforcing. Figure 4 shows how the cycle
operates.

38

Figure 4: Bully Behavior Cycle

But what drives bullies to act as they do? The answer is that there are a number
of possible motivators. A brief examination of these motivators is helpful for better
understanding why bullies engage in bullying. Dennis Lines136 lists a range of behaviors
that have been associated with bullies. Bullies may display one or a combination of these
behaviors.

1. Heartless violence: Characterized by a complete lack of remorse and feeling.
Individuals displaying this type of behavior lack anxiety, are utterly untroubled by
events normally considered disturbing, and have the ability to kill in cold blood.
2. Strategic bullying: Characterized by a continual, systematic abuse of power.
Such abuse is not a single time, impulsive event, but a pre-planned and continual
act of harassment in which the bully puts down a weaker subject, humiliates them,
and torments them.
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3. Bullying for kicks: Characterized by deriving pleasure from taking aggressive,
hurtful action against others, whether such action is physical or psychological in
nature.
4. Bullying for approval: Characterized by engaging in bullying as a means to
increase one’s popularity, to win self-approval (which is a trait hard-wired into
the human system). Fulfills a desire to be recognized.
5. Impulsive bullying: Characterized by lashing out impulsively when annoyed, in
a manner suggesting that one has a limited repertoire of responses for dealing
with tension; acting without thinking, putting aside all other possible factors of
causation (factors that might explain why someone engaged in behavior that the
bully finds annoying).
6. Reactive bullying: Characterized by reflexive behavior which has no
preconceived outcome other than one which is primarily defensive; behavior
displayed when one has reached his/her tolerance threshold and reacts violently
out of pent-up frustration.

This list illustrates that bullying behavior is clearly motivated by a desire to serve
oneself at the expense of others. Given the selfish and harmful nature of such behavior,
one might wonder what the consequences of bullying are and whether the behavior is
sustainable.
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Confronting Bullies
At the individual level, the presence of an authority figure is generally seen as the
only effective way to address the imbalance of power between the bully and the victim.137
It is questionable whether bullying can be halted in the absence of an authority who is
willing to intervene and who has the power to dispense justice by applying sanctions to
the bully. However, it is suggested that while an authority figure can prohibit bullying
from occurring, a potential drawback to intervention by an authority is that such
intervention might actually increase the bully’s desire to continue bullying whenever the
authority is absent. Further, the intervention of an authority figure might inadvertently
endanger the victim. Bullies might perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the victim informed
on them. Consequently, the bully might retaliate against the victim as soon as the
authority is absent.138 Moreover, in situations concerning a group of bullies acting in
concert, intervention by an authority might have the unintended consequence of more
strongly uniting the bullying group; as soon as the authority is no longer present, bullying
will continue and may become more intense.139
The concept of peer involvement has also been suggested as a mechanism for
exerting authority and for preventing or even halting bullying.140 With respect to
childhood bullying, some schools have implemented programs in which peer groups are
used to mitigate and discourage bullying behavior. In such programs, referred to as
“bully courts”, peers render judgment about the culpability of the bully or bullies, and
recommend penalties for bullying behavior. Hence, the use of peer pressure can be an
effective method of deterring and diminishing bullying behavior, though whether it is
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ultimately as effective as intervention by someone in a position of authority remains less
clear.
Certain experts recommend that if an authoritative body of some kind does exist,
it is incumbent on the authority to communicate openly and directly with bullies about
the importance of treating others fairly. Bullies should be made aware, in no uncertain
terms, of the potential consequences of their behavior.141 The assumption is that bullies
will curb their abusive behavior if they are aware that institutional monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms are in place, and that bullying behavior will not be tolerated.
Likewise, positive reinforcement is suggested as a means to mitigate bully behavior.
Bullies might behave less disruptively if incentives are in place for good behavior.142
A number of experts who have studied bullying in the workplace suggest that
directly standing up to bullies is the most effective way to deal with them. Victims are
encouraged to take command of the situation, to exercise confidence, to project courage,
and to be proactive in dealing with bullies.143 Naturally, however, effectively employing
confrontational tactics can be hindered by the power differential that exists between
bullies and their victims. As such, victims are advised to solicit help from outside
sources such as friends, family, and coworkers. Victims also have the option of
documenting the mistreatment they endure at the hands of their tormentors. It is
recommended that whenever possible, those targeted with bullying should prepare a case
against a bully citing evidence of mistreatment. Such evidence can then be formally
presented to senior parties within the organization. If a victim feels the problem cannot
be resolved internally, they always reserve the right to take the case to the public.144
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Victim Profile
While literature on bullying behavior naturally focuses on the characteristics,
attitudes, and actions of the bully, it is well understood that no study of the behavior is
complete without some level of consideration being given to the traits and actions of the
victim. An awareness of who victims are and how victims respond to actions directed
against them is essential for developing a thorough understanding of bullying behavior
and its effects. Understanding the characteristics of victim behavior and appreciating the
importance of victim perception is essential for analyzing any situation in which bullying
behavior may be occurring.
To begin, much of the literature on bullying behavior reveals that many experts
prefer to use the term “target” as opposed to “victim” in referring to someone who is
subjected to bullying. Their rationale is that the term “victim” tends to imply
helplessness and excludes the power of hopefulness, whereas “target” leaves room for the
notion that those subjected to bullying can still be empowered to stop it.145 For purposes
of this study, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
A number of traits tend to define victims of bullying. Poor social skills is one
such trait. These can include: appearing to be vulnerable (e.g. looking scared); being
non-assertive (e.g. give-in too easily to the bully); having a tendency to act in a way that
rewards, and thus reinforces, bullying behavior (e.g. cries when picked on); appearing to
be withdrawn and solitary; and, occasionally being aggressive and annoying. Most
victims do nothing actively to provoke their tormentors; their helplessness, or sense of
helplessness, does it for them.146 Victims often suffer from stress, adverse physical
effects, poor performance at school or work, or may be fearful of going to school or work.
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Likewise, friends may turn their backs on victims for fear of also being outcast or being
targeted by the bully.147 Occasionally, victims will pick on another person smaller and
weaker than themselves, and target others for bullying just as they themselves have been
targeted. In such cases, victims may vacillate between being a victim and being a
bully.148
Victims are generally lumped into two categories: passive and provocative. The
victim’s personality, passive or provocative, will affect the type of response one can
expect to observe when the victim is confronted with aggressive, bullying behavior.
Passive victims are generally submissive and respond to bullying behavior by seeking to
assimilate rather than express any displeasure. They tend to be physically slight,
unassertive, and too reticent to retaliate.149 Confronting the bully is certainly not
something a passive victim prefers to do. Provocative victims, on the other hand, are
those who tend to react strongly, even aggressively to bullying behavior. Such
individuals tend to be hot-tempered, highly emotional, and are likely to react hostilely
when bullied. In some situations, they may lose complete control in responding to
provocation from the perpetrator.150 Whether victims are passive or provocative, they are
generally ineffective in stopping bullying from occurring and often invite further bullying
through their actions. If they do not retaliate, they inadvertently reward bullying
behavior and risk exposing themselves to constant harassment.151 At the same time, if
they overreact they risk receiving continued or even harsher treatment from their
tormentors.
Given that bullying behavior necessarily implies the existence of a power
imbalance, all victims are, by definition, weaker than those who bully them. Although
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victims may choose not to respond at all to being bullied (passive response), or while
they may choose to respond in a way that is counterproductive (provocative response),
often victims will seek authority intervention to redress the imbalance of power between
themselves and the bully.152 The type of outside assistance a victim seeks depends on the
circumstances under which bullying occurs. At school, for example, redressing the
imbalance of power may mean getting teachers, parents, siblings, or older students
involved. At work, the victim may seek the involvement of management to address the
issue. In other settings, victims sometimes choose to address the power imbalance and
associated bullying behavior by seeking authority intervention from suitable tribunals or
courts of law. Ultimately, an authority can put a stop to the bullying by applying
sanctions, suspending, dismissing, or taking legal action against the bully.153 In extreme
cases, the authority might even choose to use physical, forcible measures to address the
issue.
Finally, one must not overlook the importance of victim perception. As noted
earlier, the definition of bullying depends largely on how aggressive behavior is
perceived by the target of the behavior. Dr. Denise Salin154 points out that when experts
define bullying, the perpetrator’s intent is typically not part of the definition. Instead, the
subjective perception of the victim is stressed. In general, the emphasis has been on the
target’s own perceptions, as it can be assumed that many of the reported consequences of
bullying, such as ill-health, reduced commitment, and decreased productivity, are
strongly associated with the target’s own evaluation of the situation.155 Hence, whether
bullying is occurring or not depends largely on how behavior directed at the victim is
interpreted by the victim. If the victim perceives actions directed against it as unwelcome,
45

inappropriate, and/or oppressive, then it is generally accepted that bullying is occurring.
If behavior directed at the target is not perceived by the target to be troublesome, then it
is less certain whether bullying is actually occurring.
Overall, the victim’s perspective contributes significantly to the definition of
bullying behavior. However, it must be reiterated that simply because a party considers
itself to be a target of aggressive behavior does not necessarily mean this is so. There
may be instances in which one party engages in behavior that is misinterpreted by another
as aggressive. Some experts acknowledge that the legitimate use of power to persuade is
a matter of perception and position. Coercive action intended to be benevolent can be
perceived as hostile and unwelcome, but such action, while interpreted as bullying by
those subjected to it, remains strongly defended by those who initiate it.156 Ultimately,
the targeted party’s sense of being oppressed and of being bullied is a highly significant
and necessary, but not the sole determinant of whether bullying is occurring.
Benefits and Costs of Bullying
Can bullying be in any way beneficial? The answer appears to be yes, though
only from the perspective of the bully. Simply put, a bully’s coercive behavior permits
him to achieve his goals. A bully is able to attain and exert dominance through his
aggressive acts, and this can result in access to social resources such as the power to
persuade, increased friendships, increased popularity, and at the individual level,
increased mating opportunities.157 Studies have shown that bullying is positively
correlated with peer nominations of power, social prominence, perceived popularity, and
peer leadership.158 As such, bullying permits the bully to derive some degree of respect
from those around him. To be sure, such respect results from harmful acts and is based
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on fear rather than genuine admiration. But the bully benefits from this nonetheless.
Consequently, so long as the bully remains unchallenged, it appears he has incentive to
continue engaging in aggressive behavior, and the bully behavior cycle discussed earlier
is set in full motion.
The question concerning the potential benefits of bullying has also been
approached from an evolutionary angle. In considering the natural evolution of human
beings, Volk, Camilleri, Dane, and Marini contend that bully behavior is often associated
with positive outcomes for the bully in terms of growth and survival. In a competitive
environment in which resources are scarce and survival is the overriding concern,
bullying can be quite valuable.159 In such circumstances, bullies are not only better able
to acquire material resources, but they can acquire physical protection for themselves and
their resources by building a tough reputation, increasing their position in a dominance
hierarchy, and gaining allies.160 It is suggested that this, in turn, may help prevent future
conflicts and may minimize certain costs such as physical injuries or loss of tangible
resources.161
However, while bullying may derive benefits for the bully, the consensus among
researchers is that the behavior is by-and-large costly, and even destructive. Bullying
behavior’s destructive consequences are most evident in the impact it has on the victims.
Those targeted by bullies often suffer from severe stress resulting from persistent fear of
being harmed. Depression often results from repeated public shaming. Victims are
made to feel inadequate and worthless.162 Researchers debunk the commonly held
misconception that bullying can be good for victims in terms of “toughening them up”.
Rather, it has been concluded that bullying is abuse, and that the degree of pain the victim
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experiences far outweighs any benefit derived.163 In short, the adverse psychological
impacts of bullying on the victim cannot be understated.
In addition to the costs imposed on the victims of bullying, bullying can be costly
for the bully. Although bullies may derive benefits from their behavior in the short term,
in the long term their behavior can be a severe liability. Perhaps most prominently,
bullies can end up being outcast by society, and especially harmful acts might be met
with severe judicial punishment. School age bullies, for example, are four times more
likely as non-bullies to be convicted of crimes by early adulthood.164 Moreover, since
bullies exercise control over others through instilling a sense of fear, the interpersonal
relationships bullies maintain with others are often insincere and hollow. Friends of
bullies may be friends only inasmuch as they perceive their interests are advanced by
associating with the bully, and only insofar as they seek to remain off the bully’s target
list. Over time, such associates may elect to avoid the bully altogether, resulting in social
isolation of the bully. Likewise, bullying can have harmful consequences for the bully if
the victim chooses to take revenge. Fried and Blanche refer to the “cycle of pain, rage,
revenge”,165 in which a victim’s pain can lead to an outburst of victim rage accompanied
by devastating acts of revenge directed against the bully. In fact, Fried and Blanche
submit that the enormous pain bullying can cause feeds a cycle that can transcend the
level of the individual and can escalate into larger, even global-scale conflicts.166
In sum, although bullying may offer some advantages for the bully in the short
term, the overall consensus among experts is that the behavior is harmful for both the
bully and the victim. A review of the impacts of bullying suggests that the behavior is
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ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive. When bullies engage in aggressive,
abusive, harmful actions against others, they necessarily harm themselves.

International Bullies and Victims
The foregoing sections establish the groundwork for exploring bullying behavior
in the context of China’s relations with its neighbors. However, before thoroughly
examining this case, it is necessary to call attention to one important caveat. Existing
literature on bullying focuses overwhelmingly on such behavior at the individual level. A
great deal of research has been conducted on bullying among school-age children, and
researchers have examined bullying among adults in the workplace. However, it appears
that virtually no research has been conducted on bullying behavior at the international
level. Admittedly, a case can be made that aggressive and harmful actions committed by
one state against another has been adequately addressed in the volumes of international
relations literature that has been published concerning state-state interactions. However,
while history is replete with examples of powerful states strong-arming weaker ones in a
manner that could certainly be interpreted as bullying, current literature simply does not
discuss interstate interaction in the context of “bullying behavior”.
Admittedly, caution must be exercised in attempting to draw linkages between
two very different levels of study. Extrapolating from findings on bullying behavior at
the individual level and applying the results to the international domain is no simple
matter. It may seem a bit of a leap to draw conclusions about state behavior from
observations made on the playground or at the workplace. Naturally, interactions
between states are inherently more complex. The multitude of variables that impact
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interstate relations complicates the process of drawing parallels between bullying at an
individual level and bullying on a global scale. Nonetheless, an exploration of bullying
behavior occurring at the person-to-person level is warranted as it provides an
opportunity to identify the fundamental characteristics of bully behavior. Familiarity
with these characteristics can certainly contribute in some respect to better understanding
the causes and consequences of aggressive nation-state behavior.
With the aforementioned caveat in mind, it is possible to examine the research
done at the individual level and apply it to state-state interactions. As one examines the
findings on bully behavior at the individual level, it becomes apparent that states, too, can
exhibit many of the characteristics of both bullies and victims. States that bully other
states engage in behavior that is ultimately characterized by the threat or actual use of
violence against another state. As with individuals, it can be expected that for bullying to
occur, there must first be a power differential that invites the bullying; states that bully
others are expectedly more powerful than those they target. Furthermore, as with
individual bullies, states engaging in bully behavior do so in ways that are aggressive,
their acts are intentional, and the acts are repetitive. Certainly the acts are harmful,
though whether they are unwarranted and unjustified is a matter often open to debate as
states that engage in aggressive behavior often justify their actions as a necessary
response to an action committed by the target state. States might be perceived as bullies
if they challenge the status quo and attempt to overturn long-established norms. Unlike
individual bullies, who are motivated by a sense of power derived from their actions, the
motives for bullying at the international level likely transcend a basic desire to enhance
one’s own power. Certainly states seek to enhance their power, and bullying other states
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might be one way to achieve that objective. However, it seems unlikely that in today’s
world, a state would engage in bullying simply to inflate its national self-esteem. Rather
than acting disruptively and seeking power for power’s sake, it is more likely that other
factors (e.g. territory, natural resources, rectifying a perceived historical injustice)
motivate aggressive behavior.
One might also find parallels between bully victims at the individual level and
victims at the state level. Certainly in both cases the targeted party experiences a sense of
being oppressed. A targeted state will likely experience adverse psychological effects
from being bullied, and it may also incur various forms of physical punishment from the
bullying state. In either case, one can expect that bullied states will react negatively to
the actions directed against them. Unlike individuals, who may choose not to take any
action at all and simply endure their misfortune, bully victims at the state level will likely
respond by publicly protesting against the bullying. Targeted states might even actively
seek help from authoritative international institutions or other states to protect themselves
from bullying states.

Examples of Bullying
Whether bullying occurs on the playground, in the workplace, or on the global
political stage, the fundamental characteristics of bullying (as discussed earlier) will
always be present. The following examples illustrate how bullying can occur at different
levels of human interaction.
Bullying at School. Perhaps the most familiar form of bullying is bullying that occurs
among children in a school setting. The practice of schoolyard bullies picking on their
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weaker classmates is a phenomenon that transcends cultures. The case of the “bashful
kid” or “different kid” being repeatedly teased and mocked by his peers is a story that
most everyone can relate to. In such instances, one or a small number of aggressors play
the role of bully, while children acting as passive bystanders reinforce the bullying
behavior by providing an audience for the bullies’ malicious acts. Bullies may
psychologically attack their victim by verbally abusing them, usually through namecalling, poking fun at the victim’s physical characteristics or mental abilities, etc. Abuse
often elevates to the physical level. The use of force, from physically removing and
stealing a victim’s possessions, to mussing the victim’s hair, to pushing and tripping, to
tackling and pinning, are tactics that are often employed by the aggressors. The threat
and use of violence, the intent to cause harm, the existing power imbalance between
aggressor and victim, the enjoyment derived by the aggressors, and the often very
apparent pain such actions cause the victim all capture the essence of bullying.
Bullying in the Workplace. Bullying among adults is perhaps most common in the
workplace setting. Although bullying at the adult level differs from childhood bullying in
terms of tactics used (i.e. bullying among adults tends to be less physical and is
predominantly psychological in nature), the overarching characteristics of bullying are
still quite apparent. Tim Field167 provides examples of the boss who bullies his
employees. Such a boss may engage in constant nit-picking, trivial fault-finding, and
occasionally undermining an employee either publicly or in private by expressing doubts
about his or her performance are certainly techniques for inflicting psychological harm.
Bullying might also consist of a supervisor engaging in belittling, degrading, ridiculing,
overruling, ignoring, marginalizing, ostracizing, or isolating an employee. A boss
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engaging in bullying behavior might set unrealistic goals and deadlines, or may change
expectations at a moment’s notice in order to irritate an employee.168
Victimization in the workplace has few bounds. Other tactics of workplace
bullying include keeping the victim in the dark about important issues by denying
information. An employee might be overloaded with work, or work might be taken away
and have menial jobs assigned as a means of inflicting injury. In some instances a bully
might steal a victim’s work, thus denying the victim credit for his/her labors, or a victim
might be denied requests for time off even in cases of illness or family emergencies.
Such tactics might rightly be labeled “oppression by management”.169 In such instances,
the classic characteristics of bullying are all clearly on display. The aggressor exercises
power by repetitively inflicting harm on someone less powerful, unwarranted and unjust
acts are committed, the aggressor derives a sense of gratification, and the victim derives a
sense of being oppressed.
Bullying on a Global Scale. Examples abound of states bullying other states, and of
states being bullied by non-state actors. One example of the former is the 1982 incident
between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands---an incident that resulted in a
brief war between the two countries. Although the citizens of the islands had been under
British protection and administrative control since the early nineteenth century, a dispute
raged over who should claim rightful ownership of the islands. In an attempt to wrestle
control of the islands from Britain, the Argentine military dictatorship dispatched troops
to overrun the islands’ meager British garrison.170 Such action was taken in spite of a
warning provided by the Peruvian Ambassador to Argentine naval commanders that,
“Margaret Thatcher won’t let herself be bullied by a military government”.171 Indeed
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Prime Minister Thatcher’s swift and harsh response, in which an Argentine naval cruiser
was sunk and British Marines recaptured the islands in an amphibious assault, indicated
that Britain would not tolerate what it considered unjustified and aggressive actions taken
by the Argentine government. The Falklands have remained under British control since
the war’s conclusion, but even today tensions between the two countries remain high over
the islands issue. As recently as 2011, the Argentine foreign minister labeled Britain
“bully boy thugs”,172 and in 2012 Falkland Islands administrators reciprocated by
denouncing Argentina’s renewed “bullying” tactics by resurrecting the issue of
sovereignty.173 Each side accuses the other of bullying and justifies their claims, in part,
by raising the issue of power disparity. Argentina accuses the more economically and
militarily powerful Britain of bullying Argentina, while Britain accuses Argentina of
bullying a tiny, weak island neighbor. Although the issue is certainly more complex than
a case of bullying on the playground or at the workplace, the key characteristics of
bullying are nonetheless present. Threats of violence, aggressive behavior, a power
imbalance, and a sense of being oppressed and victimized are all evident in this case.
While the Falklands incident provides an example of states engaging in bullying
behavior, not all cases of bullying on a global scale occur uniquely between states. One
need simply turn to the terrorism conflict between the United States and al Qaeda as an
example of bullying behavior between states and non-state actors. This case is similar to
the Falkland Islands incident in that both sides claim to be victimized by the actions of
the other. The American perspective is that the U.S. has become the target of
unwarranted and repeated harmful acts at the hands of al Qaeda terrorists, and that this
must stop. Likewise, al Qaeda laments that Muslims have long been victimized and
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humiliated by U.S. policy in the Middle East.174 Each side claims that the other is the
bully. Moreover, assigning the roles of “bully” and “victim” is complicated by the fact
that a chief bullying characteristic (the “power imbalance” between the aggressor and
victim) is not as clear-cut in this instance. Clearly the U.S. is a very powerful state, and
one might wonder how it could ever be considered a victim. But al Qaeda’s ability to
attack the US with devastating impact using asymmetric methods means that the “power
imbalance” is not as apparent as it might first seem. What is certain is that in spite of the
more complex nature of the interaction between the U.S. and al Qaeda, the characteristics
of bullying are still very much present. Threats and the actual use of violence is
prevalent on both sides, as is the intent to inflict harm. Actions are repetitive, and both
sides view the others’ actions as unwarranted and unjust. Likewise, both sides
experience adverse physical and psychological effects from the other’s actions.

Summary
The foregoing examples illustrate how bullying behavior can occur at various
levels of human interaction. The examples reveal how bullying behavior is characterized
by both objective and subjective features. To reiterate, bullying’s objective features
include: a power imbalance between the perpetrator and victim; a desire on the part of the
perpetrator to enhance power and inflict harm; the action is committed intentionally, is
unprovoked, and is repetitive; and, the perpetrator derives a sense of fulfillment from his
actions. But bullying behavior is also characterized by the subjective feature of victim
perception. How perpetrators’ actions are interpreted by victims is a crucial component
in determining whether bullying behavior is occurring. With this in mind, it is possible to
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more adequately examine the specific case of territorial disputes involving China and a
number of its maritime neighbors.
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Chapter 4 – Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data and present the methodological
approach used to analyze China’s recent conduct in the East and South China Seas, to
establish whether and to what degree China has engaged in bullying its maritime
neighbors, and to delineate the consequences of Chinese behavior in the region. Two
forms of data gathering were used to conduct the analysis. The first involved individual
conflict events related to disputed maritime territory occurring between China and its
neighbors from January 2009 to April 2013. The second set of data consisted of the
content of media reports related to the maritime disputes, and identifying trends in
reporting on the disputes in China and in other claimant states.
An analysis of conflict events between China and its maritime neighbors is
designed to identify evidence of Chinese attempts to intimidate or coerce its neighbors
through the use of harsh and/or inappropriate tactics. Evidence of actions to induce fear,
to obtain through force that to which China has no conceivable right, to apply physical
and/or psychological measures to pressure neighboring states, and to do so in a way that
is repetitive and injurious to its neighbors would all be indicative of bullying on China’s
part. On the other hand, the absence of such behavior would suggest that bullying is not
occurring. Even more so, conflict event analysis is designed to examine how perceived
victims respond to Chinese actions, as this is a critical part of determining whether
bullying is occurring. Noting how China’s neighbors perceive the actions directed
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against them and observing how they have reacted is essential for analyzing the nature of
Chinese behavior in the region. If it is noted that China’s neighbors perceive the actions
taken against them as unfair, unjust, and harmful, then this would suggest the presence of
bullying behavior. If, however, China’s neighbors do not express displeasure either
through words or actions, this would suggest that bullying might not be taking place.
Analyzing the content of Chinese media reports, as well as the content of media
reports from neighboring states, is also useful for determining whether China has
engaged in bullying behavior. Here too, a window is provided offering a perspective on
the nature of Chinese actions as well as reactions from China’s neighbors. Media content
and trends in reporting originating from China can be examined for evidence of bullying
which may include: the presence of intimidation and coercion tactics; possible bids by
country leaders to avoid responsibility, hide inadequacy, and blame others for
unfavorable outcomes; attempts by leaders to justify otherwise unjustifiable actions;
attempts to apply psychological pressure on others; and, sustained, deliberate, and
injurious actions directed at weaker parties. Additionally, the content of media reports
might offer some insight into the larger ramifications of Chinese conduct. Likewise,
analyzing the content of media reports and noting trends in reporting from media outlets
located in neighboring states may shed light on the victim perspective. Unfavorable
responses on the part of China’s neighbors would intimate the presence of bullying
behavior, whereas fewer unfavorable reactions may suggest that bullying has not
occurred. Moreover, noting how China’s neighbors are reacting in their media may
provide a foundation for interpreting the more far-reaching consequences of China’s
actions.
57

Taken together, the two-tiered data collection and analysis seeks to provide an
accurate and, to the extent possible, objective assessment about the character and
consequences of Chinese behavior. Ultimately, data gathered from the prescribed
methodology will be analyzed in the context of bully theory, China’s contemporary
foreign policy, and theory on the behavior of aspiring powers to determine whether China
has engaged in bullying and to explore the possible implications of China’s conduct.

Conflict Event Data
The first method used to assess Chinese conduct in the East and South China Seas
consisted of conflict event analysis. The primary purpose of this methodological
approach was to identify evidence of bully and victim behavior in China’s interaction
with its neighbors. Specifically, the approach was designed to capture evidence of state
confrontation, of threats or the actual use of violence, of repetitive, harmful actions
intentionally committed, and of victim behavior to include a perceived sense of injustice
and oppression. Overall, the approach was designed to help characterize the nature of
China’s behavior in the region. The approach was also used to unearth any information
that might help interpret the broader impacts of China’s policy in the region. The nature
of the interaction between China and its neighbors may provide clues about the future
state of affairs in East Asia.
For analytical purposes, a “conflict event” is defined as an incident in which
China and at least one other state enter into dispute over maritime territory. The specific
behavior ranges from physical violence and the use of force, to diplomatic maneuvering,
to the introduction of policies resulting in friction between China and other nations.
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Clashes at sea, incidents resulting in a harsh exchange of rhetoric between China and
other nations, and implementation of policies that lead to public outcries and diplomatic
protests are some examples of such incidents. Conflict event data were gathered from
various news agencies’ internet websites and from organizations devoted to tracking
developments in Asia’s disputed maritime zones. For example, the Center for a New
American Security regularly posts information related to territorial disputes in East Asia’s
maritime regions and was particularly helpful for identifying specific conflict events
involving China and neighboring nations. I selected January 1, 2009 as the starting point
for my analysis since, as we have already seen, it was approximately at this point that an
apparent shift occurred in Chinese foreign policy away from its historical, nonconfrontational approach toward a deliberately more assertive approach. I included
conflict events occurring through the end of March 2013, which appeared to be a logical
termination point for the analysis given that China underwent a transition of national
leadership during that month.
Conflict event data include incidents between China and East Asian nations that
share a body of water: Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Vietnam. Overall, I pinpointed a total of 27 conflict events that were
significant based on the notable levels of media attention they generated, an appreciable
degree of controversy involved, and discernible consequences of the incidents. I
analyzed each of these events in terms of who initiated the action, the nature of the action
taken by the initiator, the intended target of the action, and the target’s reaction (the
immediate effects of the initial action). My analysis is illustrated by the basic process
model depicted in Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5 – Process Tracing to Analyze Conflict Events

Admittedly, for every event analyzed, both parties to the conflict blame the other
for having initiated the dispute. For example, China often cites its historical ties to the
South China Sea, and blames the Philippines and Vietnam for initiating conflicts by
engaging in activities there and failing to recognize China’s historical claims. As such,
identifying the “initiator” of any given conflict event relies to some extent on subjective
decision-making. However, in order to remain as objective as possible, I based my
determination of who initiated each conflict event not on historical claims, but on recent
developments that appeared to be outside the norm of usual events. Atypical action was
generally considered an indicator of initiation. An example of atypical action would
include a scenario in which a nation operating its vessels without incident for some time
in a specific part of the South China Sea is suddenly ordered by another nation to halt its
activities and withdraw its vessels. In this case, the order to withdraw would be
considered outside the norm of usual events, and the nation giving this order would be
considered the initiator.
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After identifying both the initiators and apparent targets of each conflict event,
specific attention was paid to target country reactions. In order to maximize objectivity in
analyzing the data, I chose to focus as much as possible on official government reactions
as opposed to more general, public reactions as reported in the media. Targeted country
reactions, elicited from the initiator’s original actions, were identified by conducting
thorough online searches of official government websites as well as websites of reputable
media organizations. For each event, at least two sources listed the event, and in some
instances as many as six sources listed the event. For example, nations’ foreign ministry
websites and government web portals often provided original source, official government
reactions to specific events. Media outlets also occasionally ran reports in which official
government responses were provided. Official government reactions consisted of written
statements, comments made by high ranking officials or spokespersons during press
briefings, and transcripts of speeches given by government leaders. By examining
official government reactions, it was possible to gain insight into the victim’s perspective
of each conflict event. This, in turn, proved valuable for characterizing the nature of the
initiator’s behavior. Specifically, it proved useful for determining whether the initiator’s
behavior can accurately be characterized as bullying. Further, official government
reactions provided clues about the broader implications of the initiator’s actions. Tying
specific target reactions to distinct follow-on effects proved difficult. However, taken in
sum, the targets’ reactions provide a basis for interpreting events that occur after each
original conflict event. As such, the analysis permits one to draw linkages between
initiator actions, targets’ immediate reactions, and events occurring some time later.
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Media Content and Trend Analysis
In addition to analyzing individual conflict events to assess China’s behavior and
its effects, I conducted a review of media reports to identify how the maritime claims
issue has been addressed in the media of various claimant states. Specifically, I
investigated the extent to which maritime territorial disputes between China and its
neighbors have received media attention in all countries directly involved in the disputes.
In addition, I examined the content of individual media reports, noting the tone with
which the issue was addressed in each report. The purpose here was to determine
whether the number and content of media reports regarding maritime claims issues
reveals any evidence of bullying behavior committed by China. The presumption was
that a review of media content and trends would, at a minimum, offer insight into the
victim perspective. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, media content analysis
might provide insight about the broader implications of China’s maritime policy in East
Asia; this methodological approach could be useful for interpreting how Chinese policy
in the region impacts the future for China as well as for the entire region.
My examination includes surveying the content of reports from select news
services in Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Vietnam. Analysis was conducted by accessing the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) Open Source Center media database, which offers a collection of news
reports produced by media outlets from around the world, translated into English. My
method of analysis included selecting one of the most prominent print media sources
from each country, and recording the extent of coverage these sources dedicated to the
disputed claims issue. The selected news sources for each country were as follows:
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Brunei (The Brunei Times), China (Xinhua), Indonesia (Kompas), Japan, (Asahi
Shimbun), Malaysia (The Star), the Philippines (Philippine Star), South Korea (Chosun
Ilbo), Taiwan (Taipei Times), and Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency). These sources
were selected based on their high in-country level of readership and popularity
ranking.175
I chose to limit my searches to a single prominent print media source for each
country as opposed to searching all possible media sources within that country (i.e. other
print publications, television, radio, and internet sources) for two reasons. First, the sheer
number of media reports provided when searching across all possible media sources
would have made examining them all a daunting task for a single researcher. In some
cases, my search using a single media source for each country produced well over several
hundred search results. Sifting through each of these media reports to determine whether
they were relevant proved to be a rather laborious task. Second, if I had searched more
than a single media source for each country, I might have encountered repetition of
original reporting. For example, a topic originally reported in one print publication might
very likely have been picked up by another print publication, or by television, radio, and
internet media outlets. Thus, I would have risked counting unoriginal reports, thereby
skewing the results of the analysis.
The Open Source Center’s media database permits a researcher to conduct
advanced searches on specific topics of interest. The database allows users to select a
specific country, time frame, media source, and key words or phrases. Table 2 shows the
specific search parameters I used for individual countries.
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Table 2: Search parameters for identifying media reports
Country

Source

Dates

Brunei
China

“Brunei Times”
“Xinhua”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12
1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Indonesia

“Kompas”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Japan

“Asahi”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Malaysia

“Star”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Philippines
South Korea

“Philstar”
“Chosun”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12
1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Taiwan

“Taipei Times”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Vietnam

“Vietnam News”

1/1/92 – 12/31/12

Key
Words/Terms
“south china sea”
“south china sea”
or
“east china sea” or
“diaoyu” or
“senkaku”
“south china sea”
or “spratly” or
“dispute”
“east china sea” or
“senkaku”
“south china sea”
or “spratly” or
“paracel” and
“china”
“south china sea”
“yellow sea” or
“east china sea”
and “china”
“south china sea”
or “east china sea”
“south china sea”

As Table 2 indicates, I originally set the timeframe for each search as January 1,
1992 to December 31, 2012. This timeframe was selected since it provides a sufficient
period of time over which media trends can be tracked and any significant changes in
trends can be noted. (Note: Unlike the conflict event analysis portion of the research, I
did not include the first few months of 2013 for the media content and trend analysis
portion of the research. Since tracking trends on an annual basis requires a full-year’s
worth of data, it would have been inappropriate to include media data for a mere portion
of 2013.) After conducting an initial search for each country, I combed through the
results to ensure that only relevant reports would be included in the analysis. For
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example, if the search for Japanese media reports returned an article that mentioned the
East China Sea in a context completely unrelated to China and the maritime disputes, I
discarded the report. Those articles addressing the disputes and China’s role in them
were counted as relevant. For example, articles addressing the following topics were
counted as relevant: alleged sovereignty violations, continental shelf disputes,
government pronouncements related to the disputes, jurisdictional claims, ship and
airborne patrols of disputed areas, natural resource surveying, suggested methods of
cooperating to resolve the disputes, actions taken to stake claims or build a legal basis for
making claims, etc. In this manner, I created lists of relevant media reports for each
country, and I noted the number of reports published for each year through 2012.
After generating lists for each country and recording the overall number of reports,
I reviewed the content of each report. For articles generated in countries other than China,
I noted whether the reports depicted China in a negative context, or whether the tone
expressed regarding Chinese policy was more cautious or benign. For reports derived
from within China, I noted whether each report expressed displeasure with the actions of
neighboring nations, or whether the sentiments expressed were more moderate. For each
country analyzed, I noted the percentage of “negative” (i.e. critical, disapproving, or
accusatory) media reports. Conclusions about China’s behavior and the consequences of
its behavior were then based on the number and content of these negative media reports.

Summary
Conflict event analysis and media content and trend analysis help to characterize
China’s recent behavior in the context of bully theory. Moreover, this dual methodology
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helps identify potential consequences of China’s policy. To reiterate, the primary
purpose of conflict event analysis is to illustrate how nations in the region have
conducted themselves and how they have responded to each other’s actions. The purpose
of examining the content of media reports and noting trends in reporting is to determine
whether such information might be useful for characterizing China’s behavior (i.e. to
determine whether there is evidence of China bullying its neighbors), and to discover
what the broader implications of China’s policy might be (i.e. how that policy affects
China as well as the entire region).
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Chapter 5 – Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to present the overall findings of the research in
order to accurately characterize Chinese behavior and to identify its consequences. The
chapter begins by introducing the 27 recent conflict events occurring in the East and
South China Seas that are significant for determining whether China has bullied its
neighbors. Each event was dissected into four key components: the event initiator, the
action taken by the initiator, the targeted party, and the targeted party’s reaction. The
events were then analyzed for evidence of bullying behavior. Following the analysis and
discussion of these 27 conflict events, findings are presented from the media content and
trend analysis portion of the research. Observations made during this phase of the
research were analyzed to uncover evidence of bullying behavior and to identify possible
consequences of such behavior.

Conflict Event Analysis
An analysis of conflict events was informative in terms of identifying specific
instances in which China initiated action against other countries. Ultimately, I identified
China as the initiator in 25 of the 27 conflict events observed. Although China would in
each case consider its actions to be justified responses to the actions of other nations, and
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while recent flare-ups stem from disputes that admittedly have been ongoing for some
time, I concluded that China was the initiator in 25 of the observed instances given that
no recent, discernible action was taken by the other parties to provoke China. Table 3,
beginning on the next page, depicts a summarized version of the data gathered for each
event.
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Table 3 – Significant Maritime Incidents in the East and South China Seas (January 1, 2009 – March 31, 2013)
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Date
Apr 22, 2010

Initiator
China

Action
Conducts anti-submarine warfare
exercise near Japan;
8 destroyers, 2 submarines transit
through Miyako Strait;
Helicopter flies close to Japanese
Coast Guard vessel

Target(s)
Japan

Target Reaction
Lodges formal diplomatic protest;
Defense Minister expresses
displeasure that Japan wasn't
notified in advance of passage of
such a large naval contingent

Sources
Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Asia Times

May 3, 2010

China

Warns Japanese Coast Guard vessel
against conducting survey

Japan

Lodges formal diplomatic protest

Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

May-July 2010

China

Seizes several Indonesian fishing
vessels using armed Fisheries
Management vessels;
Accuses Indonesian vessels of illegal
fishing

Indonesia

Confronts Chinese vessels;
No official government reaction;
Media criticizes China

Jakarta Post

Sept 7, 2010

China

Accuses Japan of violating Chinese
sovereignty after Chinese fishing
vessel and Japanese Coast Guard
vessel collide;
Lodges diplomatic protest;
Threatens to withhold shipments of
rare earth metals to Japan;
Demands apology and compensation
from Japan

Japan

Arrests Chinese fishing crew;
Charges captain with criminal act;
Releases captain after two weeks;
Issues statement dismissing
China’s demand for an apology as
“completely groundless and
utterly unacceptable”

Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Mar 3, 2011

China

Orders Philippine survey vessel near
Reed Bank (Spratly Islands) to cease
activities

Philippines

Lodges formal diplomatic protest;
Sends Coast Guard vessels to
protect survey ship;
Commander of Philippine
Western Command states, "It's
clearly our territory. If they bully
us, well even children will fight
back."

Philippines Official
Gazette: Office of the
President,
The Jamestown
Foundation
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Date
Mar 7, 2011

Initiator
China

Action
Flies helicopter near Japanese
destroyer near natural gas field where
China and Japan claim exploration
rights

Target(s)
Japan

Target Reaction
Calls incident "an extremely
dangerous act" and notes
government is working through
diplomatic channels

Sources
Japan Ministry of
Defense

May 21, 2011

China

Unloads building supplies near Likas
and Patag islands on contested
Iroquois Reef

Philippines

No official government reaction;
Media criticizes China

Philippine Star

May 26, 2011

China

Severs exploration cables of
Vietnamese vessel conducting
seismic survey

Vietnam

Lodges formal diplomatic protest

Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

June 9, 2011

China

Severs exploration cables of
Vietnamese seismic survey vessel

Vietnam

Lodges formal diplomatic protest;
Accuses China of "premeditated
and carefully calculated attack";
Announces live fire ammunition
drills off coast of Quant Nam
Province on June 10, 2011

Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
BBC

Aug 21, 2011

China

Patrol boats enters 12 nautical mile
zone around Senkaku Islands

Japan

Lodges formal diplomatic protest;
Refuses to recognize navigation
of Chinese vessels as innocent
passage

Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Feb 19, 2012

China

Warns two Japanese Coast Guard
vessels conducting activities in
international waters to leave the area

Japan

BBC

Feb 22, 2012

China

Denies Vietnam fishing vessel right
to land while seeking refuge from
storm approaching Paracel Islands

Vietnam

Lodges diplomatic protest;
Argues Coast Guard activity was
legal;
Calls Chinese action
“unacceptable"
Lodges official protest;
Foreign Ministry spokesman says
Chinese action "seriously
infringed" on Vietnam's
sovereignty and "gravely
threatened lives and property"

Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Initiator
Japan

Action
Names 39 uninhabited islands near
Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands

Target(s)
China

Target Reaction
Criticizes Japan's "unilateral",
"illegal" and "invalid" action;
Foreign Ministry issues statement
maintaining Diaoyu Islands
belong to China;
Issues own names and
descriptions of 70 islands near
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands

Sources
Xinhua,
Agence France Presse

Mar 23, 2012

China

Detains 2 Vietnamese fishing vessels
and 21 Vietnamese fishermen near
Paracel Islands

Vietnam

Asks China to immediately and
unconditionally release all
fishermen;
Lodges official diplomatic protest

Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Apr 10, 2012

China

Sends 8 fishing vessels to disputed
Scarborough Shoal;
Sends surveillance ships and warns
Philippine Navy to leave the area

Philippines

Philippines Official
Gazette: Office of the
President

Apr 19, 2012

China

Implements "national plan of island
protection" in South China Sea to
"strengthen protection and rationalize
exploration of China's island
resources";
Promotes establishing tourism on
uninhabited islands

Vietnam

Deploys largest warship to
Scarborough Shoal;
Searches Chinese vessels, finds
illegal catches;
Accuses China of serious
violation of Philippines
sovereignty and maritime
jurisdiction;
Presents official position on
Scarborough Shoal and associated
waters
Submits strongly worded
statement;
Says plan violates Vietnamese
sovereignty;
Urges China to scrap plan
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Date
Mar 2, 2012

71

Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Date
June 21, 2012

Initiator
China

Action
Unilaterally raises administrative
status of Xisha, Zhongsha, and
Nansha islands from county level to
prefectural level;
Permits city of Sansha to administer
the three island groups and their
surrounding waters;
Announces plan to establish military
presence at Sansha

Target(s)
Philippines,
Vietnam

Target Reaction
Philippines:
President rebukes China's move
in State of the Union address on
July 23, 2012; States, "If
someone entered your backyard
and told you he owned it, would
you agree? Would it be right to
give away that which is rightfully
ours?"

Sources
Philippines Official
Gazette: Office of the
President,
Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Vietnam:
Sends note of protest to Chinese
Foreign Ministry;
Calls development a violation of
Vietnamese sovereignty and
"strongly opposes" establishment
of Sansha City.
July 13, 2012

China
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Pressures Cambodia at ASEAN
summit to keep Code of Conduct and
territorial issues off the table;
Insists settling territorial disputes is a
bilateral matter between individual
nations

Philippines,
Vietnam

Philippines:
Issues statement deploring
ASEAN non-issuance of joint
communique
Vietnam:
Issues statement expressing regret
over failure to issue joint
communique
United States:
Issues statement criticizing
China's "divide and conquer"
strategy
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Philippines Department
of Foreign Affairs,
Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
U.S. State Department

Date
Sept 11, 2012

Initiator
Japan

Action
Purchases Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands
from private Japanese owner

Target(s)
China

Target Reaction
Issues official statement saying
China will not be "subject to
bullying and humiliation from
others";
States it will not back down on
territorial issues following
nationalization of the islands;
States, "The Chinese government
will not sit idly by watching its
territorial sovereignty being
infringed upon.”

Sources
Chinese Government
Official Web Portal

Nov 1, 2012

China

Issues new passports with a map
depicting the entirety of the South
China Sea belonging to China

Philippines,
Vietnam

Philippines:
Refuses to stamp new passports;
Stamps a separately issued visa;
Reasserts position that 9-dash line
is inconsistent with international
law

Philippines Department
of Foreign Affairs,
Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
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Vietnam:
Issues diplomatic protest;
Says action violates Vietnamese
sovereignty;
Refuses to stamp to new passport,
stamps separately issued visa
Nov 28, 2012

China

Extends authority to Hainan province
police to search, board "territory
violating" vessels

Philippines,
Vietnam

Philippines:
Releases statement, calls action
"gross violation" of international
law;
Says new law deserves
international condemnation
Vietnam:
Issues diplomatic protest;
Says action violates Vietnamese
sovereignty
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Philippines Government
Archives: Department of
Foreign Affairs,
Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Initiator
China

Action
Severs seismic survey cables of
Vietnamese ship near Con Co Island
(same ship that had cables cut in May
2011)

Target(s)
Vietnam

Target Reaction
Lodges diplomatic protest;
Urges all countries to abide by the
U.N. Convention on Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)

Sources
Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Dec 13, 2012

China

Flies maritime surveillance aircraft
near Senkaku Islands into Japanese
airspace;
Four State Oceanic vessels enter
Japanese territorial waters on same
day;
Two additional incidents occur (Dec
22, 24) in which Chinese aircraft fly
within Japan's Air Defense
Identification Zone, though not into
Japanese airspace

Japan

Scrambles F-15 fighter jets on
each occasion;
Lodges formal diplomatic protest

Japan Ministry of
Defense

Jan 12, 2013

China

Flies maritime surveillance aircraft
near Senkaku Islands into Japanese
airspace;
Three additional incidents occur in
Jan 2013

Japan

Scrambles F-15 fighter jets on
each occasion;
Considers authorizing Air Force
to fire warning shots at Chinese
planes entering Japanese airspace

Japan Ministry of
Defense

Jan 19, 2013

China

Directs fire control radar (used for
weapons targeting) at Japanese
Maritime Self Defense Forces
helicopter

Japan

Lodges diplomatic protest;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs says
China not in line with the facts of
the matter;
Advocates Maritime
Communication Mechanism
between Japan and China defense
authorities

Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Japan Ministry of
Defense
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Date
Nov 30, 2012
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Date
Jan 30, 2013

Initiator
China

Action
Directs fire control radar at Japanese
Maritime Self Defense Forces
destroyer

Target(s)
Japan

Target Reaction
Lodges diplomatic protest;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs says
China not in line with the facts of
the matter;
Advocates Maritime
Communication Mechanism
between Japan and China defense
authorities

Sources
Japan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Japan Ministry of
Defense

Mar 13, 2013

China

Chases two Vietnamese fishing
vessels from disputed waters near
Paracel Islands

Vietnam

Publicly affirms Vietnam's
sovereignty over islands;
States Vietnam is resolutely
opposed to any infringement on
its sovereignty

Vietnam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Sources: Agence France Presse, Asia Times, BBC, Chinese Government Official Web Portal, Jakarta Post, Jamestown
Foundation, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Ministry of Defense, Philippine Star, Philippines Department of Foreign
Affairs, Philippines Government Archives: Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President,
Philippines Official Gazette: Department of Foreign Affairs, U.S. State Department, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Xinhua.
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A review of the 27 events listed in Table 3 reveals numerous items of interest.
First, it is important to note that the number of conflict events occurring between China
and its neighbors has progressively increased over the past several years. A total of four
significant conflict events occurred in 2010, followed by six in 2011. But in 2012 alone,
the region saw thirteen such events, and in the first three months of 2013, four events
occurred. It is apparent that the trend in the occurrence of conflict events is increasing.
Second, it is worth noting that a majority of conflict events resulted in highly
unfavorable official government reactions. In 24 of the 27 cases, governments of
targeted nations issued diplomatic protests or strongly worded statements. Given that a
majority of the 27 conflict events were initiated by China, the high number of negative
official responses underscores how seriously and unfavorably nations have reacted to
China’s recent actions.
Additionally, analysis clearly indicates that Chinese actions are primarily directed
at three nations: Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Although China’s history with
Japan has undoubtedly been contentious, what is surprising is the degree to which China
has recently been challenging Japan over claims in the East China Sea. Between 2000
and 2009, only eight documented conflict events occurred between the two countries.
From 2009 to 2013, however, Japan has been the target of Chinese action on at least ten
occasions, of which four have occurred in the past year alone. Also surprising, perhaps,
is the frequency of recent conflict events occurring between China and Vietnam, and
between China and the Philippines. China has taken action against Vietnam on eleven
occasions since 2009, and against the Philippines on seven occasions during the same
period. It appears that action taken against China’s other maritime neighbors has been
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negligible overall. Research uncovered no instances of conflict between China and
Malaysia or Brunei, although these nations do have competing territorial claims with
China in the South China Sea. China and Taiwan have not had any public disputes over
territory in the past several years, presumably attributable to the two parties’ attempts to
build a more congenial relationship. One notable incident with Indonesia occurred in
early summer 2010, during which armed Chinese Fisheries Management vessels
escorting Chinese fishing boats near Indonesian waters seized several Indonesian fishing
vessels accused of “illegal fishing”. Interestingly, in this instance China appears to have
initiated conflict with a nation that has no directly overlapping claims with China.
Analysis also indicates that a majority of conflict events took place at the tactical
level (between lower echelon military units, ships belonging to government civilian
maritime enforcement agencies, and/or civilian fishing and survey vessels). Twenty of
the 27 events involved the use of aircraft and/or ships on the seas. The other seven
events occurred at the strategic level, involving decisions made at the highest levels of
government. Notably, all seven of these strategic level events have occurred in the past
year alone. The Japanese government’s decision to name uninhabited islands and to
nationalize the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands are two of these events. In both instances, it
was determined that Japan was the initiator. The other five strategic-level conflict events
were initiated by the Chinese government. China’s implementation of a national plan of
island protection in the South China Sea, its unilateral decision to raise the administrative
status of Sansha prefecture in the South China Sea, its alleged role in preventing the
signing of a joint communiqué at ASEAN’s 45th regional summit, its decision to issue
passports with maps depicting China’s claims to territory in the South China Sea, and its
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granting of authority to Hainan Province police to search and board vessels determined to
be violating Chinese territory all took place between April and December of 2012.
Clearly the trend in conflict events occurring at the strategic level is upward.
Moreover, analysis indicates that conflict events involving the use of military
assets are occurring more frequently. Whereas in the past China and its neighbors have
primarily relied on civilian assets to address the disputes, in the past year alone (March
2012 to March 2013), there have been five instances in which nations used military assets
to initiate or respond to provocative action. These include the Philippines use of its
largest naval vessel to respond to the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, Japan’s responding
to Chinese reconnaissance flights by sending F-15 fighter jets to intercept Chinese
aircraft, and China’s use of ship-borne target tracking radar against Japanese naval and
air assets. This recent, deliberate use of tactical military hardware contrasts with just one
prior event involving the use of such forces, which occurred in 2010 when China
conducted an unannounced anti-submarine warfare exercise near Japanese waters.
As mentioned earlier, two events were identified in which China appeared not to
be the initiator, and in which China was apparently targeted by the action. These events
include the March 2012 incident in which Japan named 39 uninhabited islands in
contested waters near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, and the September 2012 incident in
which the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands from their
private Japanese owner. In both cases Japan argues that the islands have historically
belonged to Japan, and that the actions taken were legitimate. Additionally, Japan argues
that its actions were taken in response to China boosting the number of its maritime
patrols in the region. In any event, because Japan took these actions in contested waters
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during a period of heightened tensions, and because the actions were out of the ordinary,
it seemed appropriate to identify Japan as the initiator in these instances.

Evidence of Bullying Behavior
What do the findings of the conflict event analysis suggest about China bullying
its maritime neighbors? Before answering this question, it is worth briefly reviewing
what we know about bullying behavior. First, we have seen that in order for bullying
behavior to occur, a power imbalance of some kind must exist between the aggressor and
the victim. Additionally, we know that bullying entails threats or the actual use of
violence, and that the aggressor desires to enhance power and inflict harm. We have also
learned that bullying behavior is aggressive, repetitive, committed intentionally, includes
acts of coercion and intimidation, that the actions committed are harmful, unprovoked,
and unjustified, and that the aggressor derives a sense of gratification from his actions.
Similarly, we have learned that victims, or targets, of aggression may be either passive or
provocative in their response, and that they may seek intervention by an authority
(someone more powerful than the perpetrator) to redress the existing power imbalance. It
has been established that victims interpret the action directed against them as oppressive,
and importantly, it has been shown that the victim’s perception is a highly significant
factor in determining whether bullying is occurring. Addressing evidence of both bully
behavior and victim behavior in the context of China’s interaction with its maritime
neighbors is essential for determining whether China has bullied its neighbors.
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Power Imbalance
Before examining what conflict event data suggests about China bullying its
neighbors, it is important to recognize that a precondition for bullying behavior (i.e. the
existence of a power imbalance between parties) does exist. It is well established that
China is East Asia’s largest nation both in terms of geography and population. More
importantly, however, China outmatches its neighbors in terms of both military capacity
and economic strength. China currently maintains East Asia’s largest military force, and
it ranks third in the world in terms of overall conventional military capability.176 Among
China’s maritime neighbors, South Korea is the next most militarily capable nation,
ranking eighth overall in the world, though South Korea’s military capacity remains
dwarfed by that of China.177 China’s other maritime neighbors clearly come nowhere
close to matching Chinese military strength. Military power world rankings for these
nations are as follows: Indonesia (15th), Japan (17th), Taiwan (18th), Vietnam (25th), the
Philippines (31st), Malaysia (33rd).178 Likewise, China’s economy is now East Asia’s
largest, and is the world’s second largest.179 China certainly has the economic capacity to
fund continued growth of its defense establishment. Moreover, China is able to leverage
its economic strength to apply pressure to other nations in the region. Clearly a power
imbalance exists between China and its neighbors. With this power imbalance in mind, it
is possible to sift through the data to determine whether evidence exists of China bullying
its maritime neighbors.
Threatening Behavior and the Use of Violence
The analytical findings indicate that China has engaged in threatening behavior.
This has certainly been observed at the tactical level. Chinese maritime enforcement
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vessels have warned foreign vessels to cease their activities and to stay out of “Chinese”
waters. Likewise, China has participated in unannounced and unusual passage of sizable
naval flotillas close to neighboring states, it has used helicopters to fly within close
proximity of foreign maritime vessels, it has conducted incursions of its neighbors’
airspace, and it has used weapons-targeting radar against other nations’ ships and
airborne assets. Each of these actions can certainly be, and in fact have been, interpreted
as threatening.
Threatening behavior has also been observed at the strategic level. Chinese
national authorities granting the government of Hainan province the authority to stop and
search foreign vessels transiting international waters is certainly a bold move, and it has
been interpreted as threatening not only by China’s maritime neighbors, but by all nations
whose vessels transit the South China Sea. With respect to the July 2012 ASEAN
conference, China’s interference with the regional institution’s efforts to reach an
agreement governing conduct in the South China Sea has torpedoed hopes for a swift
resolution to the claims issue and can certainly be regarded as a threat to ASEAN.
Another example of intimidating or threatening behavior at the strategic level includes
the issuing of passports with a map depicting a non-internationally recognized maritime
boundary around disputed waters. Similarly, nations have interpreted as threatening
China’s unilateral decision to elevate the administrative status of a small island city,
granting it authority to govern over a widely contested maritime area, and simultaneously
establishing a military presence on the island. In each instance, China has exhibited bold
behavior that can reasonably be interpreted as intimidating. In fact, some scholars argue
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that actions such as these are indicative of expansionist intensions and, as such, are
inherently threatening.180
Furthermore, although it appears China, in recent years, has not engaged in any
actions that might be considered “violent”, it can certainly be argued that actions such as
warning foreign vessels against conducting surveys and ordering them to cease their
activities in internationally recognized waters, chasing vessels out of disputed waters,
detaining ships and their crews, causing physical damage to equipment being towed by
foreign vessels, and deliberately conducting maneuvers in other nations’ territorial waters
and airspace are examples of intimidating and inappropriate behavior. Such behavior
certainly meets the criteria for bullying behavior.
Intentional and Repetitive Behavior
In instances where it has been determined that China initiated action against
specific targets, the actions appear to have been committed intentionally. Examples of
actions committed intentionally include: the three cable severing incidents committed
against Vietnamese survey vessels, the unloading of supplies on disputed islands with the
intent of building permanent structures, denying Vietnamese sailors the right to land and
seek refuge during a storm, detaining foreign vessels and their crews, and promoting
tourism to uninhabited, disputed islands. There is no mistaking that such incidents are
done with intent and are sanctioned by the Chinese government. Moreover, the sheer
number of times China has taken action against its neighbors over the past several years
calls attention to the fact that this type of behavior has been repetitive. Further still, the
number of China-initiated conflict events having occurred in 2012 represents a twofold
increase over the number of events that occurred in 2011. This underscores how already
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repetitive behavior is becoming even more frequent. The repetitiveness and frequency
with which China is taking action against its neighbors is indicative of the bully behavior
cycle that was described in Chapter 3. China’s desire for power promotes its willingness
to inflict harm on its neighbors. This, in turn, leads to aggressive action being taken. As
China perceives that its actions are producing the desired results, its desire for power is
reinforced and increases, and so the cycle continues. By establishing a greater physical
presence in the South China Sea, for instance, and by issuing unilateral pronouncements
claiming that the entire region is China’s sovereign territory, China believes it is
expanding its span of control throughout the region. As China perceives its power in the
region is increasing as a result of its assertiveness, the stage is set for further aggressive
action. Overall, the repetitive nature and increasing frequency with which China is
engaging in aggressive behavior against its neighbors points to evidence of bullying
behavior. Additionally, the intimidating nature and repetitiveness of Chinese actions
against its neighbors suggest that China is engaging in a specific form of bullying
behavior referred to as “strategic bullying”. Strategic bullying, a type of behavior
outlined by Dennis Lines and introduced in Chapter 3, is characterized by a continual,
systematic abuse of power. The abuse does not occur as a single time, impulsive event,
but is a pre-planned and continual act of harassment in which the bully puts down a
weaker subject.181 A review of the 25 events in which China was determined to be the
initiator certainly suggests that strategic bullying is precisely the type of behavior China
has engaged in.
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Unprovoked/Unjustified Behavior
Determining whether China’s actions were completely unprovoked and
unjustified is a matter that is much more controversial. China has always argued that its
actions are justified based on history, and that it is merely responding in a tit-for-tat
manner to protect what it claims is its rightful territory.182 In fact, Chinese leaders have
accused other nations of bullying China. For example, in responding to the September
2012 Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government
released an official statement affirming that China “will not be subject to bullying and
humiliation from others”.183 Indeed in the case of Japanese nationalization of the
Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, China has a legitimate point, and in the analysis of conflict
events, Japan was designated the initiator in this instance. Nonetheless, the analysis of
recent conflict events between China and its maritime neighbors reveals that in 25 of 27
recent instances, China deliberately initiated action against other nations who appear to
have done little at all to provoke their larger, more powerful neighbor. In fact, it could be
argued that in each of these instances, rather than being provoked, China itself acted in a
provocative manner. Examples of provocative Chinese action include deliberately
cutting the cables being towed by seismic survey research vessels, hastily establishing
new prefectures and unilaterally granting them jurisdiction over disputed territories,
unilaterally declaring sovereignty over disputed territories and distributing governmentendorsed maps with territorial boundaries unrecognized by the international community,
and claiming the right to search and seize vessels operating in waters traditionally
recognized as part of the international domain. Clearly, such actions can be interpreted as
provocative and meet the definition of bullying behavior.
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It is also worth noting that China’s actions appear to be centered around denying
its neighbors a choice in shaping the future of territorial claims in the region. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the more powerful party’s attempts to create an absence of choice
for the victim is a tell-tale sign of bullying behavior. This is what appears to be occurring
in the South China Sea. China’s actions indicate that it is pressing full speed ahead with
plans to establish its influence in the region. It seems that China is focused on a strategy
of shaping the geopolitical reality of the region before its neighbors have an opportunity
to react in any meaningful way. If China moves quickly enough, it may succeed in
achieving a veritable fait accompli, claiming enough territory to more forcefully defend
its position to the international community. For example, China’s encouraging tourism of
uninhabited islands, raising the administrative status of Sansha Island, granting the
Hainan Island provincial authority the right to stop and inspect foreign vessels, and
increasing the number of maritime patrols in the region is all done absent the choice of
China’s neighbors. Likewise, denying its neighbors the ability to hammer out an
agreement concerning conduct on the seas by interfering with ASEAN’s internal
processes, also removes the power of choice from China’s neighbors. What’s more,
China’s neighbors are virtually powerless to stop China from taking such actions and
denying them a say in the matter. In the end, the impacts on China’s neighbors are not
only physical (in terms of losing control of disputed territory), but they are psychological
as well. By acting swiftly to try and deny others a choice in shaping events, Chinese
actions are clearly frustrating its neighbors. This frustration is clearly visible in the
official, and adverse, reactions of neighboring governments. Taken together, China’s
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apparent attempts to deny its neighbors a choice suggests that it is engaged in bullying
behavior.
Victim Perspective/Response
How have China’s maritime neighbors responded to Chinese actions? This
question is central to characterizing Chinese behavior as the definition of bullying
depends largely on how targets, or victims, of the behavior react. In short, analysis
indicates that reactions to China’s recent conduct have been overwhelmingly unfavorable.
Governments of countries with whom China is engaged in ongoing maritime territorial
disputes have expressed their displeasure via direct diplomatic channels (for example,
lodging official diplomatic protests with the Chinese government), and they have
occasionally expressed displeasure by making official public statements through the
media. As Table 3 indicates, of the 25 instances in which it was determined that China
was the initiator, targeted countries lodged official protests with the Chinese government
on fifteen occasions, and on seven occasions, high ranking government officials and
spokespersons issued strongly worded statements condemning China’s actions. For
example, Japan’s Defense Minister publicly expressed displeasure in April 2010 after
China sailed a flotilla unannounced through the Miyako Strait near Japan’s southwest
islands and conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise.184 Japan’s Defense Ministry
also publicly rebuked China for what it interpreted as “an extremely dangerous act” when
in March 2011 a Chinese State Oceanic Administration helicopter flew near a Japanese
destroyer while the destroyer conducted operations near a gas field where both China and
Japan claim exploration rights.185 Another incident that occurred in March 2011, in
which China and the Philippines engaged in a row over Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands,
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led to the Philippine Western Command commander publicly chiding China by stating,
“It’s clearly our territory. If they bully us, well even children will fight back”.186 After
China severed exploration cables being towed by Vietnamese survey vessels in May and
June of 2011, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused China of premeditated
and carefully calculated attack.187 In February 2012, after Chinese Marine Surveillance
vessels issued warnings to Japanese Coast Guard vessels to leave the area and cease
conducting surveillance activities in international waters, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary
responded by calling China’s actions “unacceptable”.188 Later that same month, when
China denied Vietnamese fishermen the right to land while seeking refuge from a storm
that was approaching the Paracel Islands, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman
lamented that China’s actions “seriously infringed” on Vietnamese sovereignty and
“gravely threatened lives and property”.189 In April 2012, when China implemented its
“national plan of island protection” in the South China Sea and began to promote tourism
on uninhabited islands, Vietnam again complained that the action violated Vietnamese
sovereignty and urged China to scrap the plan.190 Finally, when China raised the
administrative status of key islands in the South China Sea to the prefectural level and
announced that one of the islands would administer all surrounding waters, the President
of the Philippines rebuked the move in his State of the Union address, stating, “If
someone entered your yard and told you he owned it, would you agree? Would it be right
to give away that which is rightfully ours?”.191 Clearly China’s neighbors perceive
Chinese behavior as unjust, inappropriate, and oppressive.
Literature on bully theory suggests that victims tend to react to bullying in a
manner that is either passive, allowing the bully to continue his tormenting unpunished,
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or provocative, reacting strongly to the bully’s provocative actions. As Chapter 3 points
out, whether the victim’s reaction is passive or provocative, bully theory suggests that
victims are generally ineffective at halting the bullying behavior directed at them. Does
conflict event data suggest anything about whether the targets of Chinese actions are
responding in a way that is either passive or provocative, and whether their reactions are
effectively dissuading China’s behavior? Certainly it appears that those targeted by
Chinese actions are not reacting passively. In each of the 25 instances in which China
has initiated action against its neighbors, those neighbors have responded by protesting in
some manner. In some instances, displeasure was expressed in more subtle terms. For
example, when the 2012 ASEAN summit resulted in ASEAN’s first-ever failure to reach
an agreement, the Philippines issued a statement deploring the non-issuance of a
communiqué (source: Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs), and Vietnam publicly
expressed regret over the failed summit (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs); neither
the Philippines nor Vietnam issued an official diplomatic protest over perceived Chinese
meddling resulting in the failure. In other instances, target nations’ protests were much
more pronounced. For example, in response to China’s actions near the Scarborough
Shoal in April 2012, the Philippine government not only released its official position on
the shoal and its associated waters, but it harshly and publicly rebuked China for
violating Philippine sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, the Philippines
sent its largest warship to the shoal to protest Chinese actions there. Certainly China’s
neighbors are not responding passively to the actions directed against them. In fact, it
could be argued that reactions among China’s neighbors have in some instances bordered
on provocative victim behavior. However, in none of the 25 instances does it appear that
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the reactions of China’s neighbors are having any substantial effect on curbing Chinese
policy. Ultimately, China continues to engage in assertive behavior against its neighbors,
and it appears that its neighbors, at least individually, are virtually powerless to stop it.
This is just as bully theory would predict: victims, on their own, are generally ineffective
at stopping bullying from occurring.

Conclusion
An analysis of conflict events shows how China’s actions in recent years can
certainly be perceived by its neighbors as bullying behavior. A review of the 27
identified exchanges between China and its neighbors reveals evidence of bullying as
defined by bully behavior theory. Such behavior includes: threatening and intimidating
behavior, unprovoked, unjustified, and harmful actions intentionally directed against
weaker parties, and the recurrence of such behavior over a prolonged period.
Furthermore, it is clear that China’s maritime neighbors have not taken kindly to China’s
policy. Given that the target/victim perspective weighs heavily in determining whether
bullying is occurring, and given that the analysis shows how multiple nations have
lamented the behavior directed against them, it is certainly reasonable to conclude that
since 2009, and from the perspective of its smaller neighbors, China has engaged in
bullying.

Media Content and Trend Analysis
A review of media reporting on the maritime claims issue reveals that the issue
has been garnering higher levels of public attention in key claimant states since 2009.
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This is especially so in China, as Figure 6 illustrates. The amount of reporting from
China’s Xinhua news service increased over ten-fold between 2009 and 2012, and the
raw number of reports in China was the highest among any country in the region in 2012
(595 reports addressing the issue). Among China’s neighbors, the increase in reporting
has been most pronounced in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. As Figure 7
illustrates, in 2012 Japan’s Asahi Shimbun reported on the disputed claims thirty-four
times more often than it did in 2009. Data also show that by 2012, the Philippine Star’s
reporting on the issue had increased more than twenty-fold over 2009 levels. In Taiwan,
the Taipei Times addressed the issue seventeen times more often than it had in 2009, and
in Vietnam, by 2012 news coverage had more than tripled. It should be mentioned that
although data were collected for the years 1992 – 2012, Figures 6 and 7 only depict
results for the period 2007 – 2012. I elected to trim the period of data displayed in
Figures 6 and 7 and begin in 2007 primarily as a matter of convenience for viewing the
data; for each country, year-by-year reporting levels prior to 2007 were comparable to
the number of reports in 2007. Likewise, I elected not to display results for some
countries at all. The number of media reports for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South
Korea were negligible, and plotting the results from these countries would only have
cluttered Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Number of Chinese media reports related to maritime territorial disputes
(Data compiled from Open Source Center: Xinhua news service.)
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Figure 7: Number of media reports from China’s maritime neighbors, related to maritime
territorial disputes
(Data compiled from Open Source Center: Philippine Star, Vietnam News Agency, Asahi
Shimbun, and Taipei Times.)
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Media Reporting in China
An analysis of Chinese media reports reveals that the Chinese press has been
highly critical of China’s maritime neighbors in recent years. Of the 988 media reports
analyzed for the period 2007-2012, on average 60% portray the actions of outside nations
in a negative context. Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, in particular, have been the
subjects of condemning news articles, although the United States has also been the
recipient of a fair amount of criticism. The percentage of reports pointing a critical finger
at other nations has fluctuated year-by-year since 2007. In 2008 and 2011, for example,
relatively low percentages of negative reporting was observed, while in 2009, 2010, and
2012, substantial spikes were witnessed in the percentage of chastising reports. The high
percentage of negative reports in 2012 seems particularly significant given that the total
number of reports for that year jumped dramatically to nearly 600 (a six-fold increase
from 2011).
Table 4: Number and percentage of Chinese media reports critical of China’s neighbors

Number of
Reports
Percent Critical
of Neighbors

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Reports /
Average Percent

41

42

58

143

109

595

988

49%

23%

57%

62%

30%

70%

60%

Media reports disseminated by China’s official news agency, Xinhua, have
several fascinating characteristics. First, unlike what is observed in the media of certain
neighboring nations, there is absolutely no questioning of Chinese government policy on
the territorial claims. No opposing views on policy are expressed, and no sympathy is
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offered for the other claimants. The impression one is left with is that China is convinced
of the rightness of its position on the disputes. Given that Xinhua is a direct extension of
the Chinese government, such one-sided reporting is not entirely surprising. Second,
Chinese media reports refer frequently to China’s official stance on questions of
sovereignty. Examples include a report published in September 2012, in which Chinese
representatives reiterate China’s position on the Diaoyu Islands to Japan,192 and another
published in April 2012, in which a background paper provides “basic facts on Chinese
sovereignty over Huangyan Island”.193 Moreover, the topic of China’s right to maritime
territory is addressed in absolute terms. Chinese press reports often refer to China’s
“indisputable sovereignty” and its legal right to administer areas that in fact remain
heavily disputed. China has touted its “indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel
Islands”,194 its “indisputable sovereignty” over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,195 and its
“indisputable right” to gas exploration in the East China Sea.196 Such language indicates
the degree to which Chinese officials are absolutely convinced of the rightness of their
claims. Third, there is an unmistakable pattern of Chinese media honing in on specific
incidents in which China and other nations butt heads over territorial matters. Ample,
perhaps excessive, media coverage is then dedicated to these incidents. For example,
Japan’s purchase of the Senakaku / Diaoyu Islands in September 2012 triggered a deluge
of media reports in which Japan was repeatedly and harshly criticized. Articles and
columns routinely leveled accusations, such as Japan’s “theft” of the islands197 and of
Japan “forsaking pacific principles”.198 When China was embroiled in a tense dispute
with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in the spring of 2012, similar accusations
were made. Articles chastising the Philippines for its “illegal claims”,199 and warnings
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issued to the Philippine government not to “exacerbate tensions” in the South China
Sea200 were regularly published. Fourth, there are numerous instances in which Chinese
media attempt to demonstrate that China has international support for its position and
policy. A number of articles mention how international scholars from various corners of
the globe (for example, Kenya,201 Belgium,202 Germany,203 Spain,204 and Austria205 argue
that China’s position is steeped in international law and is completely legitimate.
Likewise, reports about Chinese communities around the world publicly supporting
China’s position often are present. Articles discuss demonstrations among Chinese
supporters living in Los Angeles,206 Houston,207 Canada,208 Angola,209 and Indonesia,210
for example. Finally, a number of reports address China’s insistence that territorial
matters be handled only by those nations directly involved in the disputes, and that
outside nations should remain distanced. China accuses the U.S. specifically of
“meddling” in the region’s maritime affairs, and laments how such outside interference is
“detrimental to Asia-Pacific peace”.211
Evidence of Bullying Behavior
Do Chinese media reports reveal any evidence of bullying behavior on China’s
part? A thorough examination of the reports shows that some do contain certain
characteristics that can be linked to bullying. The message that China appears to be
sending in some articles can certainly be interpreted as threatening in nature. For
example, a report concerning China sending an “advanced” patrol ship to monitor the
situation in the South China Sea after China’s standoff with the Philippines over the
Scarborough Shoal appears to send an ominous message to the Philippine government. 212
Another article, which states “Maritime Authority says PRC to stop Japan’s illegal survey
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activities” suggests a certain degree of threat directed at Japan.213 Yet another,
explaining that the “PRC sends patrol ship to East China Sea on bid to guard territorial
rights”214 could be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate other nations in the region.
And a threat is certainly implied in a report that warns other nations of “due consequence
if they make serious strategic miscalculations in the South China Sea”.215 Although
China in no instance advocates the use of violence against its neighbors or any other
nation as a method of settling the disputes, the tone conveyed in these articles is
unmistakably stern and can certainly be interpreted as threatening. However, other
reports in which China criticizes its neighbors use language that is less intimidating.
Articles such as those that “urge” the Philippines not to escalate tensions,216 that “ask”
Japan to stop causing new disturbances,217 and that say the U.S. “should” cease stoking
tensions218 might be insulting and patronizing, but it is difficult to argue that such
language is threatening.
As previously mentioned, media reporting reflects that China takes an inflexible
position when it comes to territorial disputes. Reports of how China “vows absolutely no
concession” on the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands issue219 and how China “never accepts
Japan’s ‘control’ of waters” near the Islands220 suggest a certain obstinacy and absolutism
that might be interpreted as threatening. Maintaining its position while rejecting any
possibility of compromise implies that China may be willing to resort to extreme
measures if its neighbors push their agendas too hard. However, it may be a stretch to
conclude that such apparent inflexibility necessarily signals threatening behavior.
Without question, China’s criticism of its maritime neighbors and other nations is
done intentionally and is highly repetitive. The stream of insults directed at Japan, the
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Philippines, and Vietnam is consistent throughout the timeframe analyzed. Certainly
there is a concerted effort among Chinese leaders to point the finger at these nations and
accuse them of causing all the trouble that has occurred in the East and South China Seas.
Moreover, the oftentimes harsh language that is used to describe these nations’ actions
(e.g. accusations of engaging in “banditry”,221 and charges of acting with “duplicity”222)
is harmful. As theory on bullying behavior makes clear, bullying involves behavior that
is harmful, intentional, and repetitive in nature. The harmful words used in Chinese
media reports and the intentional and repetitive manner in which the reports are
disseminated suggest that bullying may be occurring.
We have also learned that bullying behavior is often driven by attempts to hide
inadequacy and avoid responsibility for behavior and its effects. 223 Indeed, there are
instances in which Chinese media reports reflect attempts by China to avoid
responsibility. For example, every time China “urges” its neighbors not to cause trouble,
or implores them not to deliberately create disputes in the East or South China Seas,
China absolves itself of all responsibility and shifts responsibility to other parties. In
China’s view, it is clearly always the other party that is at fault for existing tension. Such
unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the numerous quarrels that have occurred
supports the notion that China is engaging in bullying behavior.
Finally, an analysis of Chinese media reports suggests that China is engaging in a
particular type of bullying behavior, discussed in Chapter 3, known as “bullying for
approval”. This type of behavior is characterized by engaging in bullying as a means to
increase one’s popularity, or to win self-approval.224 The very one-sided reporting that
China disseminates is meant not only to signal to outside nations what China’s position is
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on the territorial disputes, but is meant for audiences inside China’s borders. Indeed, it
seems that a primary purpose of the reporting is to shape domestic attitudes on the issue.
In essence, it appears that China’s leaders are using their control of the media to win the
Chinese public’s approval for their actions. Shaping public attitudes and securing public
approval is certainly consistent with China’s core interest of protecting and maintaining
the current system of government. Doing so permits the Chinese Communist Party to
derive public support for its actions and helps the Party maintain legitimacy. Reports in
which China vows never to give concession on disputed territories,225 frequent reporting
about Chinese maritime vessels patrolling disputed waters to fight illegal exploration,226
harsh language used to describe the acts of other nations, and frequent calls for other
nations to respect China’s indisputable sovereignty all project an image of strength and of
a government protecting the interests of its citizens. Hence, it certainly appears that the
concept of bullying for approval applies.

Media Reporting in Neighboring Countries
Content analysis of media reports originating in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan,
and Vietnam shows that a significant proportion of the reporting from each country tends
to paint China in a less than favorable context. Chinese policy concerning disputed
territory was regularly criticized, and neighboring nations often lamented Chinese actions
on the seas. Somewhat surprising, however, was that in some instances, the articles
published took an introspective approach, questioning whether home-government policy
on the territorial disputes has been appropriate.
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Japanese Media Reporting
Of the 272 Japanese media reports analyzed, approximately 57% express anger,
irritation, frustration, or concern over Chinese policy and cast China in a negative context.
Significantly, the vast majority of negative reporting occurred between 2010 and 2012,
with the highest number (136 reports) published in 2012.

Table 5: Number and percentage of Japanese media reports critical of China

Number of
Reports
Percent Critical
of China

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Reports /
Average Percent

5

6

4

79

42

136

272

40%

33%

25%

68%

49%

54%

57%

One recurring theme of Japanese media reports concerns Chinese violations of
Japanese territorial waters and airspace. Reporting includes allegations of Chinese ships
“illegally” entering Japan’s maritime territory.227 Some reports even argue that China has
elevated the disputes to a new level by expanding territorial violations beyond the seas
and into the air above the seas.228 In all such reports, China is depicted as the aggressor.
Other reports, too, make it clear who the finger is being pointed at. Japanese reporting is
replete with accusations of China acting like a “spoiled child”229 and of China engaging
in “provocative acts”.230 China’s acts are characterized as “unacceptable”,231 references
are made about “Beijing’s maritime aggression”,232 and Chinese policy is labeled as
“hard-line and counterproductive”.233 Moreover, reports sometimes lament how China
has handled the disputes issue poorly. For example, one article accuses a “newly
assertive China” of condoning island-landing stunts by Chinese activists,234 another
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report suggests that PRC patrol boats spotted near Japanese islands is “demonstrative
behavior”,235 another claims that China is far from being a sensible power with respect to
handling island disputes,236 and yet another accuses China of acting “outrageously”.237 In
some instances, even more colorful language is used to portray China as an aggressor.
For example, one column refers to China as a bird of prey “spreading its talons” against
Japan in the Senkaku dispute,238 and another recommends that Japan must “keep a close
eye on what the bully will do”.239
Although a majority of the reports published tend to level criticism at China, a
good number of them take a more moderate approach to addressing the disputes. These
articles address the ongoing disputes with China, but they do not portray China in such a
negative context. For example, reports addressing plans by Southeast Asian nations to
unite for talks with China in no way point a finger at China.240 Likewise, articles
addressing how experts from Japan and China have made calls to establish a private
sector forum to resolve the Senkakus dispute,241 and of the Chinese Embassy’s attempts
to thaw ties with Japan242 certainly do not assign blame to China. Some articles penned
by Japanese editors even discuss what Japan’s role should be to ensure that the disputes
are resolved peacefully, and in some instances, articles appear to point the finger at
Japanese leaders for poor policy regarding the disputes. For example, themes that often
arise include the need for Japan to seek careful diplomacy with China over the Senkakus
dispute,243 the utility of pursuing a calm approach to resolving the matter,244 and the
necessity of pursuing “wise diplomacy”.245 Some reports offer alternative solutions that
Japan might pursue, to include taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice.246
Other reports suggest that Japanese politicians should work to defuse the disputes and not
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exacerbate them,247 that the “provocative” acts of some Japanese politicians must be met
with a mature response,248 and that territorial flare-ups should be handled with “cool
professionalism”.249
Media Reporting in the Philippines
Of the 327 relevant Philippine media reports analyzed for the period 2007 – 2012,
approximately 46% portray China as the party responsible for an increase in tensions.
Perhaps significantly, in 2012 (the year in which the highest number of reports were
published), an even higher percentage (54%) painted China in unfavorable terms.

Table 6: Number and percentage of Philippine media reports critical of China

Number of
Reports
Percent Critical
of China

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Reports /
Average Percent

4

14

8

8

127

166

327

0%

8%

77%

25%

39%

54%

46%

A number of reports express displeasure over many of China’s policies in the
South China Sea. For example, articles address irritation over Chinese maps depicting
disputed territory as belonging to China,250 some object to Chinese patrols in disputed
areas,251 and others express anger over Chinese passports depicting the South China Sea
as Chinese territory.252 Several articles describe Chinese “muscle-flexing” as disruptive
and resulting in undesirable outcomes such as the ASEAN 2012 debacle.253 Resentment
is also expressed over Chinese plans to bring tourists to the South China Sea,254 and some
reports reiterate the Philippines’ “exclusive right” to explore and exploit the South China
Sea.255 The language used in many reports clearly expresses the Philippine attitude that
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China’s behavior is in many respects abrasive. For example, China is urged to stop its
“provocative acts”,256 China is charged with “tightening its grip” on the Spratly
Islands,257 and China is accused of “incursions”258 and “intrusions”259 into Philippine
territory. Likewise, reports bemoan China’s “imperialistic” behavior,260 its “harassment”
of research ships,261 its attempts to “deprive” the Philippines of sea resources,262 and its
intention “to grab” Philippine territory.263 Moreover, some reports suggest that China is a
nation that cannot be trusted. An article discussing how the Reed Bank incident of 2011
“belies Chinese reassurances of peaceful rise”264 and paints China as a nefarious actor.
Further still, some reports depict China as a nation with behavioral problems. China must
“learn the ways of neighborly behavior” according to one article,265 China shows its true
nature as a “neighborhood bully” according to another,266 and on several occasions,
China is explicitly referred to as a bully in the Spratly Islands region.267
As with Japanese media reporting, many Philippine reports treat the disputes issue
objectively and do not assign blame to China in any way at all. For example, one report
proposes an information-sharing system to monitor the disputed waters and to avoid
confrontation,268 and other discuss how the Philippines wants a peaceful settlement to its
disputes with China.269 Similar to some Japanese reports, certain Philippine articles take
an introspective look at Philippine behavior. For example, one column airs concern over
what is viewed as the Philippines’ “confrontational diplomacy” with China.270 Another
report disapproves of Philippine President Aquino’s move to rename part of the South
China Sea, stating that such policy simply is “adding fuel to the conflict”,271 and yet
another article warns against the Philippines making “war noises” over the Spratlys
dispute with China.272
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Vietnamese Media Reporting
As a percentage of overall reporting, Vietnam takes the harshest stance toward
China. Of the 184 reports analyzed from the Vietnam News Agency, approximately 66%
portray China in an unfavorable context.

Table 7: Number and percentage of Vietnamese media reports critical of China

Number of
Reports
Percent Critical
of China

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Reports /
Average Percent

6

9

19

27

58

65

184

43%

50%

80%

66%

64%

68%

66%

One recurring theme concerns anger over new Chinese maps depicting the
entirety of the South China Sea as belonging to China. In particular, a number of articles
express exasperation over China’s issuance of passports with the controversial maps
printed on them.273 Reports argue that such claims on China’s part are “totally illegal”.274
Other recurring themes include frustration over China’s unilateral declarations of fishing
bans,275 of China seizing Vietnamese fishing vessels,276 and of China’s maltreatment of
Vietnamese fishermen.277 Vietnam has complained about China’s plans for tourism in
the Paracels,278 reports have raised concern about the development of uninhabited
islands,279 and numerous articles affirm Vietnam’s sovereignty over portions of the South
China Sea.280 Overall, the language used by the Vietnamese press is not as colorful or as
biting as some of the language found in the Philippine and Japanese media, but the
number of complaints leveled against China is certainly larger in percentage terms.
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Not all Vietnamese media reports point a finger at China, and some address the
maritime disputes in terms that tend to be more moderate. More benign reports tend to
flaunt Vietnam’s commitment to UNCLOS,281 its support of an ASEAN-endorsed Code
of Conduct for the South China Sea,282 Vietnam’s desire to resolve the disputes
peacefully,283 and its desire to bring peace and security to the region.284 Occasional,
more upbeat reporting discusses Vietnam and China reaching consensus on resolving the
South China Sea disputes peacefully.285 Interestingly, unlike the Japanese and Philippine
cases, the list of Vietnamese media reports contain no reports questioning Vietnamese
leadership’s policy on the disputes. Such a lack of introspection or self-criticism is not
surprising given that the Vietnamese News Agency is a state-run media organization.

Media Reporting in Taiwan
Reports originating from Taiwan are generally easier on China than those
originating from Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Overall, the tone of reporting is
less harsh. Moreover, fewer reports (as an overall percentage of reporting) portray China
in an unfavorable context. Of the 111 Taiwanese reports analyzed, only 31% tend to
point a finger at China for the problems occurring in the South and East China Seas.

Table 8: Number and percentage of Taiwanese media reports critical of China

Number of
Reports
Percent Critical
of China

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Reports /
Average Percent

2

8

4

5

22

70

111

0%

0%

25%

20%

25%

36%

31%
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Those articles that do portray China in negative terms express concern over
China’s potentially hawkish stance,286 discontent over China’s new passports,287 and
uneasiness over China’s plans to invest massive amounts of funding into building
infrastructure on islands in disputed territory.288 Some reports urge that China exercise
restraint and respect internationally-recognized freedoms of navigation in the South
China Sea,289 while other reports discuss the need for China to earn respect and not throw
fuel on the fire of growing tensions in the South China Sea.290 Other reports express
concerns related to China’s increasing maritime surveillance capabilities, its threatening
of Japan, its detaining of Vietnamese fishermen, and its claim to the South China Sea in
its entirety.291 Taken together, however, the concerns expressed in the Taiwanese media
are done in a manner that is much less accusatory than what is observed in Japanese,
Philippine, and Vietnamese media.

It was determined earlier, through an analysis of specific conflict events, that
China’s neighbors are expressing their displeasure through official government channels.
But indications of unfavorable reactions to China’s maritime policy do not stop at
statements from government officials. Media analysis also reveals that Chinese conduct
is generally perceived by the public to be unjust and inappropriate. But to what extent
does the content and trend analysis of media reports from sources outside China provide
evidence that China is bullying its neighbors? The findings certainly suggest that China’s
neighbors perceive themselves to be victims. First, it is evident from the sheer volume of
reports painting China as an aggressor that China’s neighbors are upset with its behavior.
It certainly cannot go unnoticed that one out of every two reports in Japan and the
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Philippines, and two out of every three reports in Vietnam, portray China in an
unfavorable context. Moreover, considering that the number of reports in each country
has increased substantially in recent years, these results are even more striking. Although
the percentage of negative reports originating from the Taiwanese press is lower than that
of other countries, it is still significant that one out of every three Taiwanese media
reports discusses China’s maritime policy in an unfavorable context. Clearly, such high
numbers reflect a sense of being subjected to wrongful treatment at the hands of China.
Second, the language used in a number of reports to describe China’s policy
reflects a sense of having been victimized. The choice of language varies by country. In
some instances, the language is quite pointed, even biting. In other instances, the
language is more subtle, but nonetheless condemning. Unhappy and dissatisfied attitudes
are captured in words such as “illegal” and “imperialistic” (in describing China’s activity).
Likewise, referring to “Beijing’s aggression”, China’s “muscle-flexing”, its “hard-line
and counterproductive” stance and “demonstrative behavior”, and directly labeling China
a “bully” all illustrate how China’s policy is being interpreted as oppressive by its
neighbors. The use of such language in media reports indicates that, at least to some
degree, China is perceived to be a threat to stability and an aggressor inappropriately and
unjustly pursuing its agenda.
Moreover, media reports providing open criticism of China’s behavior reflect
evidence of non-passive victim behavior. Those opposed to China’s policy are choosing
not to remain silent in their opposition. In fact, it could be argued that in some instances,
the harshness of tone expressed through the reporting and the use of specific language
might be indicative of a provocative victim response. Referring to China as a “spoiled
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child” and inferring that China is some kind of beast ready to “spread its talons” supports
the notion that the response is at times provocative. Whether or not these types of
responses should be interpreted as provocative, arguments made via the media criticizing
China’s maritime policy and characterizing Chinese behavior clearly reveal a sense
among China’s neighbors of having been victimized. Reports such as those that accuse
China of dividing ASEAN over the South China Sea,292 that complain about Chinese
unilateral enforcement of fishing bans in waters claimed by other nations,293 and that
decry Chinese violations of sovereign airspace294 indicate a prevailing sense of being
unjustly targeted by inappropriate and aggressive Chinese action. Such perceptions on
the part of China’s neighbors support the assertion that China has engaged in bullying
behavior.

Conclusion
In sum, media content and trend analysis illustrates that disputes over maritime
territory have become increasingly contentious since 2009, at a point when China is
known to have implemented a more assertive foreign policy. The substantial increase in
reporting both in China and among neighboring claimant states demonstrates that the
issue is high in the minds of the region’s public. Moreover, a general increase in the
number of reports in which China and its neighbors paint each other in a negative context
suggests that the issue is becoming increasingly contentious. As with conflict event
analysis, a review of media content demonstrates why China is perceived by its neighbors
as a bully. Characteristics of bullying behavior consistently surface in Chinese media
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reports, and characteristics of victim behavior are manifest in a number of media reports
disseminated by China’s neighbors.

Figure 8: Editorial cartoons depicting China as a bully

Source: The Philippine Star, March 8,
2011. “Editorial: Peaceful rise?”

Source: The Philippine Star, March 18,
2009. “China Must ‘Learn the Ways of
Neighborly Behavior’ to Earn Respect”.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze Chinese activity in East Asia’s disputed
maritime regions in order to interpret China’s conduct from the perspective of smaller
states. In doing so, three specific questions were asked: Is China bullying its maritime
neighbors?; What are the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully?; and,
What is the impact of Chinese behavior for the East Asia region? Conflict event analysis,
as well as media content and trend analysis, demonstrate why China’s smaller, less
powerful neighbors believe China has engaged in bullying behavior. A close
examination of how China has interacted with other parties to the disputes reveals key
characteristics of bullying behavior. China has engaged in intentional, repetitive,
intimidating, and harmful behavior. Evidence suggests that such behavior has been
committed by the Chinese government in an attempt to derive power and enhance its
position in the region. Some evidence suggests that such behavior has been committed,
at least in part, to seek approval from a domestic audience. China has not yet taken
violent action against its neighbors, but its increasingly assertive conduct in recent years
has raised concern across the region that violence may eventually ensue. Furthermore,
and importantly, evidence illustrates that China’s behavior is perceived by its neighbors
to be oppressive, unjust, and inappropriate.
Naturally, the view from the Chinese side of the debate differs dramatically.
China dismisses the allegation that it has bullied its neighbors. From its perspective, the
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country has simply exercised its rightful claims to territory that has always belonged to
China. For others to judge China’s behavior as bullying is unjust and represents a gross
misreading of history. To be fair, China has endured historic injustice at the hands of
more powerful nations. But whether such treatment excuses China’s current behavior is
debatable.
It is prudent to at least briefly examine China’s behavior from the perspective of
an aspiring state. Such an examination is important for arriving at a final assessment of
China’s behavior. Realist theory posits that all states within the international system act
rationally, pursue their self-interests, and that the primary concern of all states is survival.
China is no exception in this regard, and there is no doubt that Chinese leaders justify
their actions as necessary for ensuring national survival. From China’s perspective, its
policy in the East and South China Seas is not a matter of pushing around other nations
simply because it can. Rather, it is about establishing conditions for sustained economic
growth and social development, one of China’s three core interests. In addition, as
economic growth enhances China’s national power, Chinese leaders are able to advance
China’s other core interests: protecting national sovereignty and sustaining the current
political establishment (i.e. maintaining the ruling status of the Chinese Communist
Party). Consequently, Chinese leaders, mindful of the need to establish conditions for
continued economic growth, act with little regard for how other nations perceive their
actions.
One might justify China’s behavior by arguing that it has simply conducted itself
in a manner that is typical of aspiring powers. As nations grow more powerful and
influential, their actions are bound to eventually be interpreted by less powerful states as
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intrusive, and perhaps even as unjust and oppressive. In some instances, this can result in
conflict. Does this mean that aspiring states should be penalized for endeavoring to
advance their position in the international hierarchy and for trying to improve the quality
of life for their peoples? Perhaps the answer lies in the methods aspiring powers use to
advance their interests. China appears to have made a conscious decision in 2009 to
replace a policy of non-confrontational pragmatism with a much more assertive, arguably
abrasive approach to foreign policy. Analysis suggests that this new policy has certainly
contributed to the increased tensions that now afflict the East and South China Seas. The
method China has chosen to advance its interests has attracted a great deal of enmity
within the region, and it is therefore reasonable to question whether the approach has
been suitable.
Two lines of thought might explain China’s behavior in its role as an aspiring
state. Balance of power theory and power transition theory both accept the notion that
nations act rationally, but they differ in their explanation of the onset of conflict.
(Balance of power theorists submit that a wide discrepancy in the balance of power
results in conflict, whereas power transition theorists argue that a more equal distribution
of power leads to conflict.) Curiously, both theories might explain China’s behavior in
East Asia’s maritime regions. China’s emergence as the region’s dominant power has
provided its leaders incentive to pursue their nation’s interests without having to account
for the concerns of other nations in the region. In essence, given that the balance of
power in the region has shifted to China’s favor, Chinese leaders are empowered to
pursue their interests as they see fit, even if their actions risk increasing tensions and the
potential for conflict. This is just as balance of power theory would predict. At the same
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time that balance of power theory might explain the recent increase in regional tensions,
the power transition theory may explain what is happening on a more global scale. There
is no denying that China views the United States as its chief competitor and potential
adversary. Although China clearly still trails the U.S. in terms of military power and
power projection capability, its economic power is quickly reaching parity with the U.S.
(According to some estimates, China’s economic capacity is set to surpass that of the U.S.
as early as 2018.)295 Chinese leaders may have calculated that increased economic
strength places China in a position to challenge the U.S. as the world’s dominant power.
As Organski and Kugler’s power transition model reveals, when aspiring powers reach
economic parity with dominant nations, they begin to challenge those nations and the
potential for conflict increases. To be clear, there is currently no hard evidence that
China aspires to replace the U.S. as the world’s dominant power. But as we have seen,
the process of challenging the dominant power can occur gradually, long before the
critical inflection point at which a power shift occurs.296 It is reasonable to conclude that
China is using the maritime disputes as a proxy for challenging the United States.
Conflict event analysis and content and trend analysis of Chinese media reporting
supports such a claim. By challenging its regional neighbors (some of whom are U.S.
allies), China is able to indirectly defy U.S. global dominance.
Whether or not China’s behavior is justified on the grounds that it is simply acting
in a manner that is typical of aspiring powers, evidence clearly indicates why China’s
neighbors accuse it of acting like a bully. Moreover, although China’s conduct is driven
by its national interests, its more assertive approach in the East and South China Seas has
certainly contributed to the recent, elevated tensions with other claimant states.
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Consequences of China’s Behavior
Chapter 3 outlined some of the benefits as well as costs that are generally
associated with bullying behavior. It was discussed that benefits of bullying include
enhanced social prominence, peer leadership, perceived popularity, and respect; the
ability to acquire material resources in a competitive environment; and, the ability to
achieve goals through aggressive acts. Costs of bullying can include judicial punishment,
isolation, and being targeted for revenge by victims.
Chinese leaders may have calculated that acting assertively provides the
government and the Chinese Communist Party an opportunity to enhance its image. By
taking a strong stand on the matter of territorial claims, and by refusing to budge in spite
of hefty criticism from abroad, the government is able to project strength, build
legitimacy, and elicit support from its citizens. Projecting strength and building
legitimacy is especially important in light of the numerous domestic challenges China’s
leaders currently face (e.g. public anger over political corruption, economic inequality,
environmental pollution). Hence, an assertive policy in the East and South China Seas is
beneficial for Chinese leaders in that it permits them to shape the public discourse and
divert attention away from internal matters that could potentially destabilize the current
establishment.
At the same time that China might be benefitting at home by portraying itself as
strong, it is evident that China’s behavior strains and jeopardizes its relations with other
nations. As the research indicates, it appears that Chinese policy in the East and South
China Seas has contributed to an erosion of trust between China and others in the region.
Such mistrust, in turn, could ultimately upend China’s ability to advance its core interests
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over the long term. That China’s actions could result in unfavorable consequences for
China itself is not too surprising. As Chapter 3 explained, research on bullying suggests
that the behavior is ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive; parties that engage in
aggressive, harmful actions against others ultimately harm themselves.
While conflict event analysis was most useful for identifying evidence of bullying
behavior, media content and trend analysis provides some specific examples of how
perceived bullying might be costly for China. Analysis suggests that the ongoing
disputes have had a detrimental impact on economic relations between China and
neighboring nations. In Japan, for example, articles express concern about how the
ongoing Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands dispute is affecting negotiations for a free trade
agreement with China.297 Concerns are also expressed over how Chinese tourism to
Japan has suffered as a result of the ongoing row.298 In China too, articles examine the
detrimental economic consequences of increased tensions with Japan. By late 2012, a
number of articles were published addressing the negative impacts on China-Japan
tourism,299 shrinking Japanese auto sales in China (and the impacts to Chinese dealers),300
and concerns over how soured relations with Japan have taken a toll on trade ties in
general.301 In fact, some press reports cite concerns of Chinese store managers who
lament that the hit to sales of Japanese products does no good for anyone.302 It is
uncertain whether the adverse economic impacts addressed in the media are indicative of
possible larger economic troubles to come; the adverse economic consequences
encountered thus far may be isolated and short-lived. However, such consequences are
nonetheless harmful and represent how the disputes have real and unwelcome
consequences for all those in the region.
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Perhaps a more significant consequence, and one that could be more costly for
China, is that nations within the East Asia region appear to be allying with one another
and strengthening partnerships with nations from outside the region in an apparent
attempt to counterbalance a perceived threat from China. Media reports in Japan, the
Philippines, and Vietnam certainly suggest that these nations are more actively seeking
cooperation with other states in the region, and that they are developing stronger ties with
the United States. Japanese media discuss more active cooperation between Japan and
the U.S. on military drills, including island landing campaigns.303 Japan is also
reportedly boosting ties with ASEAN over wariness of China.304 Likewise, attention has
been given to recent first-ever joint military drills conducted by Japan, the U.S., and
Australia in the South China Sea.305 Japan is also strengthening ties with Indonesia; in
2011 the two countries agreed to annual meetings amid rising tensions in the East and
South China Seas.306 In the Philippines, media reports indicate that the Philippines and
Canada recently signed a memorandum of understanding on defense procurement.307 In
addition, the Philippines and Australia have vowed to strengthen defense relations308 and
reports discuss how in 2010, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a defense cooperation
agreement.309 In Vietnam, the Vietnam News Agency has published a number of reports
on discussions between Vietnam and other nations concerning the need to deal with
regional security challenges (i.e. mitigate the threat posed by China). Articles discuss,
for example, how Vietnamese and Japanese scholars have met to discuss regional
security issues and have stepped-up cooperation between the two nations.310 Measures
are reportedly being taken to increase cooperation with Malaysia311 and the Philippines312
as well. Reports even suggest that tensions with China over the South China Sea are
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resulting in warming relations between Vietnam and the United States. Columns
describe how Vietnam and the U.S. have asserted the need to maintain freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea,313 and the U.S. has even been referred to in the
Vietnamese press as a “leading partner of strategic importance”.314 Clearly, such
agreements on maritime security matters come as a result of perceived Chinese
aggression, and these agreements may provide convenient leverage for nations in the
event of future conflict with China. In addition, and as the research shows, strong
reactions from China’s neighbors and challenges to perceived Chinese aggression have
been the norm. In some instances, reactions have moved well beyond diplomatic protests
and media statements expressing displeasure. For example, beginning in December 2012,
Japan has reacted to Chinese sea and air patrols near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands by
directing Coast Guard vessels and military fighter aircraft to intercept Chinese ships and
aircraft operating in the vicinity.315 Japan is also responding by boosting its military
presence in the region. Plans are in the works, for example, to build a new military
installation on Yonaguni Island, merely 80 miles from the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.316
Developments such as these certainly illustrate how bullying behavior can be costly for
China. Moreover, such developments raise some level of concern for the future of the
region. The apparent aligning against China and a perceptibly more active role for
military elements in responding to the disputes poses risks for regional peace and stability
in the months and years ahead.
China’s perceived bullying behavior may also be adversely impacting regional
stability in that it is fueling public animosity in China as well as abroad. At home,
Chinese media reports have fostered anger that occasionally results in violent mass
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demonstrations. The most recent example of this was the demonstrations against Japan
that broke out in the Fall of 2012 as the Chinese media ratcheted up its reporting of
Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. These demonstrations resulted in
significant damage to Japanese businesses and property in China. It appears that China is
playing off of nationalist sentiment to advance its cause. Indeed, it has been suggested
that as socialism’s influence over Chinese politics wanes, nationalism acts as the new
preferred glue; the Chinese government uses nationalistic issues such as sovereignty over
the South China Sea and portions of the East China Sea as a way to reassert itself.317
Media analysis illustrates how the Chinese government has engaged in inciting
nationalism to push its agenda on the disputed claims issue. This is underscored by the
noticeable spike in the number of Chinese news reports dedicated to the territorial claims
issue, and the degree to which these reports champion the Chinese position while
portraying China’s neighbors in a highly negative context. By consistently and
frequently feeding the public such one-sided information, the government generates
disenchantment and focuses public anger on neighboring nations and other members of
the international community, including the United States. The problem with this policy,
however, is that the forces of nationalism are often unpredictable, and its consequences
can be quite harmful even for those who would use it for their own purposes. Every time
China stirs up nationalist sentiment, it runs the risk of igniting a situation that may grow
beyond its control. Likewise, it risks not being able to meet the expectations of the
Chinese public and runs the risk of painting itself as weak and incompetent. In the wake
of the 2012 anti-Japanese protests, for example, some demonstrators expressed
dissatisfaction with the Chinese government for not having done enough to punish Japan.
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Some protestors even accused the Chinese government of being weak. As one
demonstrator put it, “When other countries insult the United States, America strikes back
with force. But when China is actually attacked…all we do is insult the attacker. I’m
ashamed to be Chinese”.318 Clearly nationalism is a double-edged sword. If the Chinese
government does not exercise caution, uncontrolled nationalist sentiment could force the
government to act in ways it might not prefer, to include using military force against its
neighbors. Such actions would be profoundly detrimental for East Asian peace and
stability.
Animosity abroad has been stoked by China’s conduct on the seas. In Japan, for
example, a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in June 2012 revealed that 84% of
Japanese citizens had a negative view of China.319 (Such results concur with results of
the Gallup poll referenced in Chapter 1.) Moreover, by late 2012, interest for the
Japanese Coast Guard had surged to new heights as the disputes over the Senkaku /
Diaoyu Islands intensified and young Japanese began applying for positions with the
agency.320 Further, certain Japanese groups and members of government have called for
beefing up Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to respond to Chinese conduct,321 and indeed
Japanese leaders appear to be responding to such calls by publicly considering using
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to protect Japan’s territorial waters against Chinese
incursions.322 Philippine and Vietnamese media, too, warn of looming militarism in the
region,323 and government leaders have been contemplating upgrading their militaries to
meet the perceived Chinese threat.324 It is difficult to determine whether such reactions
necessarily hint at intensified conflict looming on the horizon, or whether public
animosity and the associated pressure placed on governments will eventually subside.
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What is certain is that China’s policy sows the seeds of discontent and mistrust among its
neighbors and among the Chinese people, and this certainly does not contribute to East
Asian security and stability.
Limitations of Study
All academic studies have their limitations, and this one is certainly no exception.
The conclusions arrived at in this study might be challenged in several ways. For
example, it is possible that the full range of interaction between the parties in dispute was
not captured. If this is true, the analysis would inherently be flawed, at least to some
degree. It is possible that in some instances, informal arrangements were made between
parties that were not made visible to outside observers. It is well known that nations
negotiate behind the scenes, occasionally threatening each other, extending olive
branches, or searching for middle ground. It might very well be the case, for example,
that nations who appear to be neutral on the territorial disputes, or whose criticism toward
China is muted, are actually much more upset with China than their public statements
suggest. The desire to maintain constructive relations with China might dissuade nations
from publicizing existing tensions. The converse might also be true. Nations who
publicly chastise China might be more willing to cooperate with Chinese leaders behind
the scenes. In either case, a lack of complete information on official government
positions may skew the results of the analysis. The only conceivable way to circumvent
this issue would be to employ less-traditional data collection methods, such as the use of
investigative journalism techniques or intelligence collection.
The conclusions of this study might also be challenged in that the study does not
include a thorough historical analysis of territorial claims within the region. Such an
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analysis was not included as it would have been beyond the scope of the study. However,
a better understanding of the historical claims to key territories may have provided a
proper context for more accurately interpreting the data.
The findings of the media content and trend analysis might be disputed in that
only a single newspaper from each country was selected from which to draw data.
Admittedly, noting the number and tone of articles published by a single news source
might not be the most accurate approach for drawing conclusions on an admittedly
complex issue. However, given that the most popular news source from each country
was selected, the method still provides a window for examining, at least to a fair degree,
how the issue is perceived by the public.
One might argue that the study unfairly singles out China, painting it as an
instigator and irresponsible actor in its relations with other nations. To reiterate, the
intent of this thesis was to explore China’s behavior from the perspective of smaller,
weaker states, and to use the ongoing disputes over territory between China and its
neighbors as a case environment for examining how smaller states perceive the actions of
aspiring ones. The intent was not to single out or assign blame to any particular nation.
Finally, although the study was carried out with a mind toward objective data
collection and analysis, exercising subjectivity was at times unavoidable. For example,
identifying the initiator of a conflict event and the target of the action required exercising
a degree of subjectivity. Likewise, identifying relevant media reports and gauging the
tone expressed in the reports required some subjective decision-making. Devising a more
scientific approach for identifying and interpreting media reports might enhance
objectivity in the research process. In addition, linking China’s actions with the
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consequences of those actions was a process that left room for interpretation. One
method that might help establish a link between China’s actions and consequences would
be to conduct a public survey each month within nations neighboring China. Questions
could be designed to capture views about specific events and how these events impact
attitudes toward China.
In spite of these limitations, I am confident that any objective-minded researcher
would be able to use my methodology to reproduce the same or very similar results to
those I have generated in this study. Moreover, I am confident that the same
methodology could be applied to other nations and circumstances to determine whether
bullying is occurring at the international level.

Future Research
The nature of China’s interaction with its maritime neighbors has undoubtedly
been contentious in recent years. A bold approach to foreign policy has left many of
China’s neighbors uneasy about the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the
region. Yet it is difficult at this stage to ascertain how China’s relationship with its
maritime neighbors will play out. As a nation that has historically secluded itself from
the rest of world, an ascendant China flexing its geopolitical muscles is a relatively new
phenomenon. Among the great “unknowns” is whether China’s new leaders, having
taken office within the past year, will continue to pursue the assertive policy of their
predecessors with respect to the maritime claims issue. Future research, using the
techniques employed in this study, may help answer this question. Tracking conflict
events and media trends throughout 2013 and beyond should provide indications of
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whether China has toned down its approach, or whether the assertive trend continues.
Moreover, China is currently experiencing a rapid shift in its social landscape as
its economy continues to boom. How this ultimately impacts China’s foreign policy in
the region remains to be seen. Well-designed studies that examine China’s social
transformation and relations with neighboring nations (especially in the context of bully
behavior theory) might be helpful for predicting future Chinese foreign policy.
Furthermore, this study focused on disputes between China and its maritime
neighbors. Follow-on research, employing the same methodology, might be useful for
determining whether the approach China is pursuing in the East and South China Seas is
also being pursued in its interaction with land-bordering nations such as India, Laos,
Myanmar, Russia, and Mongolia. Do these nations perceive China as a bully too, and if
so, what are the potential consequences? Ultimately, such research might help determine
whether China’s policy in the East and South China Seas is isolated to that region, or
whether it is part of a larger, more general foreign policy.
Finally, future research might include applying the model proposed in this thesis
to other instances in which smaller states accuse larger ones of bullying them. This thesis
applied bully theory to state-level interaction in one specific case, and assessed how
smaller states react when confronted with the bold policy of an aspiring state. A broader
application of this model might offer some insight into the effectiveness of small state
responses when their interests conflict with those of rising powers, and some important
conclusions might be drawn about whether bullying theory is truly applicable at the
international level. This, in turn, might even open the door to research on whether states,
like individuals, experience emotions that stem from a perceived sense of being bullied.
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Final Assessment
Since March of this year, when China’s new president Xi Jinping took power, a
period of relative calm seems to have settled over East Asia’s maritime regions.
Although none of the claimants has modified its position on maritime claims, and
although no real progress has been made on addressing the underlying issues that feed the
disputes, no major incidents of conflict between China and its neighbors have occurred in
recent months. Whether this trend will continue is questionable. It is likely that China’s
new leaders, early in their tenure, have decided to temporarily dial down the level of
assertiveness in China's maritime policy. However, if past trends are any indication of
future events, the region is likely to encounter choppy waters before too long. It must be
said that historical grievances, persistent mistrust among neighbors, nationalist sentiment,
and disputes over maritime territory have bedeviled the East Asia region for
decades. Assigning blame to any one nation for the region’s enduring volatility would be
unfair, as all claimants have contributed to the tensions that persist.
Insofar as China’s recent conduct and the reactions of its neighbors in the East
and South China Seas is concerned, it is clear that little is happening to mitigate existing
tensions. China continues to grow and continues to pursue a policy that serves its core
interests, but its maritime neighbors perceive that policy as disruptive. These small states
continue to perceive themselves as victims of unfair treatment and accuse China of being
a bully, even though China considers its actions as appropriate based on history and
national interest. Unfortunately, the friction between great power conduct and smaller
state perceptions and reactions appears to have harmful consequences for all those
involved. Without question, both great powers and smaller states contribute to that
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friction. However, as states accumulate power and enhance their ability to shape
relationships and outcomes, perhaps they incur a responsibility to more carefully consider
the positions of smaller states. The challenge, it seems, is for great and aspiring powers
like China to find a proper balance between exercising bold leadership and implementing
policy in a way that mollifies the fears of weaker members of the international
community.
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